Disparate notes on the long and short history of Eritrea
Introduction: A great deal is being said and written about Ethiopia’s loud claim of access to the Red Sea. Ever since 2024, the Ethiopian prime minister has on numerous occasions warned his neighboring seacoast countries, namely Eritrea and Somalia, that they ought to allow Ethiopia to own or lease a sufficient space for its economic needs. Ethiopia has not so far faced hardships getting its goods into the country through the port of Djibouti, apart from the obvious fact that the latter had to pay port fees, which might amount to several hundred million dollars. A long-term lease on the Red Sea coast made available either by Eritrea or Somalia would undoubtedly cut import costs. It is, however, unlikely that this could be achieved by force or threats of the use of force.
Ethiopia’s vociferous claim of access to the Red Sea, preferably through either the Eritrean port of Assab or close to it has evoked in Eritrea forgotten memories that Ethiopia, as in the 1940s, is about to claim parts of Eritrea. The Eritrean government has mobilized its human and material resources to defend its hard-won independence. The international community, no matter how that is defined, might sympathize with Ethiopia, but it could only urge Ethiopia and those concerned to solve Ethiopia’s acute need of easy and predictable access through voluntary entered negotiations and agreements. Ethiopia is not the only landlocked country in the world.
Ethiopia’s claim to a port of its own, as repeatedly put by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, is very different from earlier claims dating to the 1940s. In the 1940s, Ethiopia claimed all or parts of Eritrea on historical, geographical, and cultural grounds. As Italian colonialism of Eritrea was perceived as a short historical episode, it was argued that Eritrea must return to its Ethiopian motherland upon the demise of Italian colonialism. These days (2020s) the claim for an outlet to the sea is largely based on Ethiopia’s survival needs to conduct its trade through a port on the Red Sea it owns. With a population exceeding one hundred million, the argument goes that Ethiopia cannot remain landlocked for long. Behind the demographic weight is an unarticulated belief that Ethiopia can squeeze a lease or acquire a port of its own from those countries along the Red Sea due to its demographic and, hence, military might. And it is true. The power relations between Ethiopia and its neighbors who sit along the shores of the Red Sea, such as Eritrea, Somaliland, and Djibouti, are indeed asymmetrical.
Be that as it may, Ethiopia has no case. Access to the Eritrean ports is possible only with the consent of the Eritrean government. Ever since 1998, Eritrea and Ethiopia have not discussed the terms under which Ethiopia can use Eritrean ports.
Ethiopia’s stress on an outlet to sea in the proximity of Assab is a very strong indication of the changed landscape in the historical relations between the two countries. Ethiopia does not appear to be interested in fostering a close and intimate relationship with Eritrea—a region that once formed part of the former. If Ethiopia had been interested, it would have claimed access to the port and city of Massawa—an access that would have greatly benefited north and northwest Ethiopia, namely the regions of Tigray and Amhara. However, as I shall explain below, the current regime in Ethiopia does not appear to be interested in maintaining an active presence in northern parts of the country, namely Tigray and Eritrea. How did this come about?
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In this paper I shall attempt to outline the history of Eritrea and the position it had in the Ethiopian/Abyssinian political landscape from the late 19th century until the parting of ways in the early days of 2022. The brutal war against Tigray (2020-2022) carried out by Ethiopian and Eritrean forces came to an end in November 2022 with the signing of the cessation of hostilities, signed in Pretoria. Ethiopia made peace with Tigray without involving Eritrea, which actively participated in what the TPLF and its supporters describe as the “genocide” of Tigray.
The era of Emperor Yohannes (1872-1889), when the Eritrean region was the core of his kingdom.
Emperor Yohannes, who ruled Ethiopia between 1872 and 1889, had his capital in Mekelle. The army that Emperor Yohannes could easily command was made up primarily of Tigrinya/Tigrayans on both sides of the river Merab. He also had a solid ally and support from the Oromo army in the Wello region led by Negus Michael. Like the Ethiopian emperors before him, Emperor Yohannes’s definition of Ethiopian boundaries was greatly affected by his knowledge of the various regions and his reading of Ethiopian history. There is, however, no doubt that he considered Tigray (including both sides of the river Mereb) as the core of his Ethiopian empire “given to him by Jesus Christ” (Yohannes to Queen Victoria, found as an appendix in Portal, 1887).
By 1880. Emperor Yohannes had consolidated his power over the kings of Shewa, Wello, and Gojam and was in a better position to answer the question of the limits of his possessions. In a letter he sent to Europe in February 1881, Yohannes described Ethiopia as follows:
To the east and the south [-east], the boundary is the sea. To the west and north, where there are no seas, it is bounded by Nuba, Suakim, Khartoum, Berber, Sennar, Ennarea, Sudan, and then Dongola, Haran Dawa, Gash, Massawa, Bedew, Shoho, and Tiltal. Further, the regions inhabited by the Galla, Shankilla, and the Adal are all mine, and yet recently in the middle of Shoa, a place known by the name Harar, was taken [from us]. All the same, I listed these places so that my country’s boundaries would be known. Previously, during the Era of the Judges [1780-1850, also known as the era of the Princes] at the times of Ras Ali and Wube, and recently during King Tewodros, and even in my times, the areas taken from us are Bori, Asawurta, Zula, Asgede, Baqla, Adi Hbate Mariam, Baria Qeyih, Baria Tselim, Adi Wolete Mariam, Halhal, Moges [Bogos], Tandir, Hibub, Mensa, Bidel Tcehtel, Guhmet, Dumi, Dahmela, Sheho, Woita, Takuyi, Ennaria, Habab, Kunama, Bazen, Galla Bet, Gedaref, and Harar. Please do mediate in these affairs, for unless the worldly powers enable me to make peaceful reconciliation, how else can there be reconciliation? For the heavenly powers will not intervene. If I regain the areas I have enumerated, I shall be willing to reconcile.
Letter of Emperor Yohannes IV to Kaiser Wilhelm.
Written at the city of Samera, on the 11th day of Yekatit 1873, the year of Grace [17 February 1881]
Source: Zewde Gabre – Selassie, Yohannes IV of Ethiopia. A Political Biography, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, Appendix A.
Here it is relevant to describe the background to the letter. Not only did Egypt in 1865 occupy Massawa and the entire coastline up to Djibouti, but it also had the ambition of colonizing north and northwest Ethiopia. The objective of Egyptian aggression was to occupy the region around Lake Tana with the ambition of securing a permanent foothold at the source of the Nile. The Egyptians invaded Ethiopia twice, first in 1875 (in Gunda Gundi) and secondly in 1876 in Gura. The ability of Emperor Yohannes to defeat Egyptian encroachments is not given the importance it deserves.
In 1885, Britain allowed and encouraged Italy to occupy Massawa. Ras Alula and Emperor Yohannes began to clearly see the Anglo-Italian complicity against Ethiopia. Italian attempts to expand their possessions beyond Massawa were cut short at Dogali in January 1887. Ras Alula ambushed and killed a reinforcement force of 500 Italian soldiers. It was in the aftermath of the Ethiopian victory at Dogoali that Ras Alula defended himself, saying, “The Italians should come to Sahati only if he could go as a governor to Rome” [as reported by Gerald Portal, An Account of My Mission to King Johannis of Abyssinia in 1887: 38].
The era of emperor Menelik (1889-1913): the marginalization of Tigray and the consolidation of Eritrea as an Italian colony
Menelik of Shewa assumed the Imperial throne in October 1889. In early 1891, Emperor Menelik informed the rulers of France, Germany, Great Britain, and Russia of the territorial boundaries of his country. It is important to note that his main focus was the center and south of his empire.
In a letter that he sent to leaders of Europe, Menelik described the boundaries of his country as follows:
Starting from the Italian boundary of Arafale, which is situated on the sea, the line goes westward over the plain [Meda] of Gegra towards Mahio, Halai, Digsa, and Gura up to Adibaro. From Adibaro to the junction of the Rivers Mereb and Arated.
Towards the east are included within the frontier country of the Borana Gallas and the Arussi country up to the limits of the Somalis, including also the Province of Ogaden.
To the northward, the line of frontier includes the Habr Awas, the Gadabursi, and the Esa Somalia and reaches Ambos.
Leaving Ambos, the line includes Lake Assal, the province of our ancient vassal Mohamed Anfari, skirts the coast of the sea, and rejoins Arafale.
While tracing today the actual boundaries of my empire, I shall endeavor, if God gives me life and strength, to re-establish the ancient frontiers [tributaries] of Ethiopia up to Khartoum and as far as Lake Nyanza with all the Gallas (sic).
Ethiopia has been for centuries a Christian land in a sea of pagans. If Powers at a distance come forward to partition Africa between them, I do not intend to be an indifferent spectator.
As the almighty has protected Ethiopia up to this day, I have confidence He will continue to protect her and increase her frontiers in the future. I am certain He will not suffer her to be divided among other powers.
Formerly the boundary of Ethiopia was the sea. Having lacked sufficient strength, and having received no help from Christian powers, our frontier on the seacoast fell to the power of the Mussulman.
At present we do not intend to regain our sea frontier by force, but we trust that the Christian powers, guided by our Savior, will restore to us our seacoast line, at any rate, certain points on the coast.
Written at Addis Ababa, the 14th of [Miazia] 1883 (Ethiopian calendar, corresponding to April 10, 1891).
Source: Greenfield, Richard, Ethiopia: A New Political History, London: Pall Mall Press, 1965, Appendix III, pp. 464-65. Greenfield got the material from PO Foreign Office Papers, 1/32. Rodd to Salisbury, 13 May 1897.
The boundaries of Ethiopia were largely defined from the regional base of the emperor in power. Both emperors Tewodros (1855-1868) and Yohannes (1872-1889) paid more attention to their northern territories because of the geographical proximity.
The Ethiopian regions ceded by Menelik to Italy were later incorporated with the regions of Danakil to the southeast and Senhit/Semhar plains in the west, thus forming a new colony of Eritrea. It is important to note that the colony of Eritrea was made up of three distinct regions (both in terms of demography and ecology). The highland region, made up of five small districts (Hamassien, Seraye, Deki Tesfa, Deki Melega, and Akele Guzay), was an integral part of the Abyssinian/Ethiopian political sphere. This is fully documented, especially since the establishment of Gondar as the capital of the Ethiopian empire in the beginning of the 17th century.
The Dankil region that stretched from Massawa to the frontiers of Djibouti was populated by the Afar, whose allegiance was to the Afar kingdom of Aussa, the Afar heartland bordering Wello and Shewa. The region commonly known as Western Eritrea formed part of the North Sudanese political kingdoms, first the Funj rulers and later the Egyptians. Here again it is important to note that although the Abyssinian parts of Eritrea occupied not more than 20 percent of the landmass in Eritrea, the Abyssinian district of Hamassien was chosen as the capital of the new colony. The implications of such a colonial decision were far-reaching. The Tigrinya people and their culture became more privileged, and the Tigrinyans could easily exploit the benefits of intense contact with the colonial power and its culture. Nonetheless, the Tigrinya did not forget that they belonged to Ethiopia and that it was Menelik who gave and/or sold them to the Italians.
Emperor Yohannes defended every inch of what he considered the areas given to him by Jesus Christ himself, while Emperor Menelik, sitting as he did in the middle of the vast Ethiopian empire, did the contrary. He did not consider many of the areas north of the monastery of Debre Bizen as his own. He went even further. He allowed Italy to occupy some villages within the heartland of Emperor Yohannes. The treaty of Wichale of 1889 was a sellout from the perspective of the Tigrinya people.
The victory at Adwa in 1896, where the region of Tigray took the lion’s share, was a great disappointment. In the treaty of Addis Ababa signed in October 1896, Menelik allowed Italy to keep a great part of Tigray. As a concession, Italy recognized the full independence of Ethiopia. Moreover, Italy agreed that in the event Italy decides to abandon Eritrea, it would give it back to Ethiopia. It was a recognition (on the part of Italy) that the greater part of Eritrea belonged to Ethiopia.
The descendants of Emperor Yohannes as well as the elite of Tigray, among whom were Ras Alula and Ras Woldemikael Solomon of Hazzega, considered Menelik a traitor who sold integral parts of his country. For Tigrayans the victory at Adwa was a partial victory at best. In the aftermath of the treaty of Addis Ababa of October 1896, Blatta Gebre Egziabeher (Tekeste Negash, No Medicine for the Bite of a White Snake, 1986:11) captured the mood of the elite in Eritrea thus:
“King Tewodros and King Yohannes, may the God of Ethiopia bless their souls, preserved their mother country with great veneration. But you, your Majesty [Menelik], have severed its integral parts completely. … You are disposing of Ethiopia as someone disposes of his urine. This process is not of recent origin. It was you long before the death of Emperor Yohannes who allowed them to enter and rule in our country.”
For those Eritreans/Tigrayans who felt betrayed by Menelik, the only option left for them was the path of irredentist politics—to struggle against Italian colonial presence and to reunite with the rest of Ethiopia. According to the logic of irredentism, Menelik might sell parts of Ethiopia to any foreign buyer, but those people and regions whom he sold remained Ethiopians with the right and obligation to expel foreign domination. Irredentist politics goes against the politics of the country that ceded to a foreign nation an integral part of its territory and population.
Throughout the colonial period, it is important to remember that the monastery of Debre Bizen and its property were under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian empire. Its monks were all Ethiopian subjects. The implications were far-reaching. The monks of Debre Bizen continued to preach that the citizens of Hamassien, Seraye, and Akele Guzay were Ethiopians living under a foreign ruler approved by the Ethiopian emperor.
The Italian interlude (short episode in Eritrean/Ethiopian history).
Italy ruled over Eritrea, officially from 1882 to 1941. From 1882 to 1890, Italian occupation was limited to Assab and few kilometers around it. The period from 1890 up to 1900 was a period of great unrest and war. So, the real period when Italy exercised power over Eritrea was between 1900 and 1941. In Italian history this period is divided into two; the first part that came to an end in 1922 is known as the liberal period of Italian history, where colonial policies were greatly influenced by those put in place by Great Britain. The second period (1922-1941), known as the Fascist period, witnessed the evolution of racial and racist laws, which greatly limited the rights of colonial subjects.
Italian colonialism was experienced differently by the different regions. In the western parts of Eritrea, Italian colonial rule was readily accepted as a far better system compared to what the Muslim communities had lived under: the rapacious and intermittent rule from the Tigrayan highlands. The Danakil region, except for the isolated ports of Massawa and Assab, was left virtually ungoverned owing to the hostile ecology.
The Afar continued to pay allegiance to their leaders at Aussa. Italian colonialism faced its greatest challenge from the Tigrayan districts of Hamassien, Seraye, and Akele Guzay. In 1891 the Italians killed up to 1000 highlanders as a measure of controlling the region. Yet towards the end of 1894, the leaders of the highlands, led by Bahta Hagos, rose and rebelled against the Italian presence in their region. Many of the rebels were most probably soldiers of Ras Alula who denied the Italians access to the highlands and defeated them at the battle of Dogoali in January 1887.
It was only after Italy promised not to confiscate farmlands and respect the customs and traditions of the highlanders that rebellion ceased.
From 1905 onwards, Italian rulers of Eritrea discovered that the importance of Eritrea did not lie in its fertile lands but on its people as excellent askaris (colonial soldiers). So Italy began to send Eritrean askaris first to Somalia and then to Libya. From 1905 until 1932, more than five thousand Eritreans were permanently stationed in Somalia and Libya. Eritrean askaris were cheaper to maintain when in service and equally cheap to compensate when dead or wounded in war zones. Moreover, they were more adapted to desert and semidesert warfare compared to their Italian officers.
When Italy decided to invade Ethiopia in 1935, it succeeded in recruiting up to 40 percent of all able-bodied Eritreans as askaris and threw them into its war of aggression. The Italian occupation of Ethiopia was made possible by the Eritrean askaris. At the same time, up to three thousand Eritrean askaris deserted Italy and joined the Ethiopian patriotic resistance movement. We can state with confidence that Eritrean askaris were instrumental in helping Italy to colonize Ethiopia with minimum loss of Italian lives—a fact that made Mussolini comment that he got an empire on the cheap.
The Eritrean askaris also played an important role in undermining Italian presence in Ethiopia through their active participation and leadership in the Ethiopian resistance movement between 1936 and ’41.
Italy was defeated by a joint British and Ethiopian army in 1941. Emperor Haile Selassie, who was brought to the Sudan to lead a front against Italy, had a small force of about 1500 men, half of whom were Eritrean askaris who deserted from the Italian colonial army. Haile Selassie did not forget the loyalty of his Eritrean subjects. After the war, he settled his Eritrean subjects around Shashemene.
When the Eritrean people were asked about their future in the 1940s, the great majority of the people of Hamassien, Seraye, and Akele Guzay voted for a reunion with Ethiopia, arguing that they were forcibly given or taken by Italy. They argued that Eritrea had to be dismantled. They further argued that the continuation of Eritrea as an independent state would only benefit the Italians and the Muslims.
The question of Eritrea’s future was decided by the United Nations in 1950, when the whole of Eritrea was united to Ethiopia in a federal arrangement. The Eritrean Christians had won. They were reunited with Ethiopia, and they took the rest of the country with them.
Ethiopia during the reign of Haile Selassie: Eritrea as the cradle of Ethiopian civilization, from 1950 to 1974.
As the direct successor of the kings of Aksum, Haile Selassie considered Eritrea and Tigray the most important provinces of his empire. He loved Eritrea and the Eritrean people who fought for him since the beginning of the Second World War. Thousands of Eritreans fought on the side of the patriots, and even more deserted the Italian army when it became known that they were on their way to Ethiopia to fight against the Italians in 1940. The Eritrean Christians and many Muslims as well wanted to be ruled by him.
The emperor visited Eritrea at least once a year, and he used Asmara as a second capital city where he received foreign delegations. The Shah of Iran, the Queen of Belgium, and Joseph Tito, the president of Yugoslavia, were some of the leaders who stayed in Asmara, hosted by the emperor.
Although Asmara and the Eritrean economy flourished during his reign, there were serious challenges to the imperial view of Eritrea as the cradle of Ethiopian civilization. These challenges came both from Eritrea and Ethiopia at the same time. In Eritrea, the newly established Eritrean Liberation Front—a movement that felt completely marginalized by the government dominated by Eritrean Christians—started a war for the creation of a Muslim Eritrea. The ELF argued that all power was in the hands of Christian Eritreans and the Muslim community had lost its autonomy and its share in running the country.
In Ethiopia, the Ethiopian student movement developed a revolutionary narrative where Ethiopia was described as a prison of nationalities. The Ethiopian student movement created fertile ground for Eritreans to pursue a political future of their choice. It was during the last decade of the reign of Haile Selassie that the student movement began to call for the dismemberment of the Amhara/Tigray empire. Every nation, the Ethiopian student movement argued, had a right to self-determination, including secession.
While the emperor continued to believe that Eritrea was the cradle of his empire (the emperor visited Eritrea for the last time in August 1973), the students that he educated at a great expense were conspiring against his ideological foundations and denied him any space in their political discourse.
The Imperial system and its ideological edifice were overthrown by an armed group made up of non-commissioned officers who were greatly inspired by the political stance of the Ethiopian student movement. The new military rulers (known as the Derg) rejected the myth of Aksum and Eritrea as the cradle of Ethiopian civilization and believed that they had abolished the tyranny over the Ethiopia people imposed by the Amhara/Tigray feudal elite. At the same time, the Derg rejected the strong ideological description of Ethiopia as a prison of nationalities with the right of each nation to self-determination up to secession. The Derg argued that its revolution had created a political space for every Ethiopian citizen to enjoy equal rights irrespective of ethnicity and religion.
Eritrea during the Socialist/military regime, 1974-1991: the first phase of the decentralization of Eritrea
The Ethiopian military regime commonly known as the Derg described Ethiopians as a great people united by a revolutionary ideology where all citizens are equal and who inhabit a country that boasts as the cradle of mankind—with a fresh memory of the archaeological discoveries of Lucy at the Afar lowlands. By abolishing the monarchy, the Derg also abolished the ideology of Ethiopia being ruled by an imperial lineage that traced its origins to Aksum and beyond. Tigray and Eritrea were no longer the cradle of Ethiopian civilization.
For the Derg, all Ethiopians were equal, and there were no favored regions. The use of Amharic was not disputed, but other languages were allowed to be used in primary schools. The Derg believed that it would eventually succeed in molding an Ethiopian nation through the consistent use of the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the inherent unity of all workers of the world.
The project of building an Ethiopian nation using the Marxist-Leninist ideology failed because the forces advocating ethno-nationalism were stronger. First, it was the Eritreans, spearheaded by the Eritrean Liberation Front, that pointed out the fault lines of the Ethiopian dominant ideology. The brutal and violent attempts by the Derg against the armed forces of the Eritrean Liberation Front and the indiscriminate killings of civilians, mostly in Western Eritrea. Ethiopia was straddling a contradiction that it finally failed to resolve. The ideology of the equality of all Ethiopians did not really apply to regions and ethnic groups who demanded a greater say in the way they were governed. The Tigrayan people soon followed. However, the group that would eventually reap the greatest victory was the Oromo movement, which succeeded in mobilizing its overwhelming demography to contest power and eventually conquer it.
The Derg treated Eritrea like any other region, but as the war between the Eritrean liberation fronts continued, Eritrea lost a great deal compared to those regions where there was less armed confrontation against the state. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, established in 1971, succeeded in defeating the Eritrean Liberation Front and pushing it out from the Eritrean scene in 1981. In its war against the ELF, the EPLF sought and got military assistance from the Tigray People’s Liberation Forces.
The de-Ethiopianization of Eritrea by the Eritrean People´s Liberation Front and the Tigrean People´s liberation Front, 1976-1991.
The idea that Eritrea was never part of Ethiopia and that its existence as an Italian colony entitled it to be an independent country was developed and refined in Addis Ababa. The other view, with its origins in Cairo and which eventually led to the development of the Eritrean Liberation Front, added a new element, namely, that Eritrea, being predominately Muslim, had the right to be an independent state closely related to the Muslim and Arab world. The political climate among the Ethiopian student movement was conducive to the Eritrean discourse. As Ethiopia was described as “a prison of nationalities,” the Ethiopian student movement approved the so-called “struggle of the various nations and nationalities to self-determination, including cessation.”
On the aftermath of the overthrow of the imperial system, many nations and nationalities revolted, and Ethiopia was on the verge of being altogether dismantled. The political and military situation was critical throughout 1975 up to the end of 1977, and had it not been for the massive support of Russia (who supplied the arms) and the ca. 20,000 Cuban soldiers, Ethiopia might have disintegrated.
The Eritrean case, as it came to be known from the late 1960s until it achieved independence in 1991 [de facto], became more visible after the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie. The special relations that the late emperor had with Eritrea and Eritreans, was a real obstacle for the Eritrean liberation movements.
There are two factors that strengthened the discourse about Eritrea as a separate entity from Ethiopia. The first is the international political climate dominated by the West, which undermined the political legitimacy of the Ethiopian military/socialist regime by giving tacit support to all the liberation movements across the country. The Eritrean movements were the most articulate, as they could argue that Eritrea, by being a former European colony, had, like all other African colonies, the right to become independent. This argument gained more sympathy with time. But here it is important to stress that it was not the substantive argument “Eritrea, like all other African colonies had a right to independence,” that drew sympathy but rather the brutal method that the Ethiopian government used to keep Eritrea within the Ethiopian nation-state. Ethiopia was, quite rightly, accused of treating Eritrea and the Eritreans not as citizens but as rebels to be thoroughly defeated. The Ethiopian state had alienated sections of the Eritrean population who could have been used to solve the Eritrean issue with less violence.
During all this, the 1984 famine that struck the country opened the contradiction wide: Ethiopia continued the war relentlessly against Eritrea and the Tigray rebel groups, siphoning scarce resources for the purchase of arms instead of food to alleviate hunger and famine. Moreover, the Ethiopian socialist/military regime was accused of using starvation as a weapon of war in its attempt to defeat the “rebel” groups (as they were defined by the Ethiopian government).
The Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front, first established in 1975, played two crucial roles. First, the Tigrayans protected Eritrean forces from massive Ethiopian military campaigns. Second, the Tigrayans fostered an image of Eritrea as a colony that had to be freed from the clutches of Ethiopian colonialism. At times the Tigrayans were more adamant in defending the colonial thesis than the Eritreans themselves.
The TPLF’s active policy of pushing Eritrea out from Ethiopia, 1991-2018
1991 was indeed a watershed in Ethiopian/Eritrean history. The Derg (wrongly accused of being dominated by the Amhara) was overthrown. The Tigrayan Peoples’ Liberation Front assumed state power with considerable support from the army of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front. The new rulers introduced and implemented two very controversial policies. The first was the reconfiguration of the country along ethnic and linguistic criteria. They created ethnic regional states with the right to self-determination, including secession. The second policy was that of treating Eritrea like any other neighboring state. Both policies were to have far-reaching consequences and were to the detriment of the TPLF and the Tigrayan people.
It is doubtful whether the Tigrayans fully understood the implications of the constitution that they put into force in 1995, where Tigray emerged as one of the minority ethnic states in the country. In hindsight, we know that they were advised not to introduce such policies that would eventually lead to their own marginalization within the Ethiopian political system. They refused such advice on the naïve belief that neither the Amhara nor the Oromo would ever pose a danger to the political and military hegemony of the TPLF (Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front).
Equally destructive and counterproductive was the Tigrayan policy on Eritrea. The newly established Eritrean government made it clear that it sought very close relations with Ethiopia and that its long-term goal is the economic and political integration of the two countries. The Ethiopian state, now under the firm control of the TPLF, was adamant in its refusal to work for the political, economic, and societal integration of the two countries. The TPLF maintained that Eritrea, a former colony of Ethiopia, had to pursue its future without any preferential treatment on the part of Ethiopia. Vehement protest from Eritrea to the contrary fell on deaf ears.
Ethiopia’s deliberately crafted policy of shutting Eritrea out of Ethiopia led to the 1998-2000 war, where the boundary between the two countries, which had been porous before, was effectively sealed, followed by a state of no war, no peace that lasted nearly two decades.
Although the TPLF-led Ethiopia managed to inflict serious economic and diplomatic damage on Eritrea, the latter did not remain powerless. In the history of the relations between the two countries, between 1998 and 2018, we can observe two recurrent themes. Ethiopia continued to stress that Eritrea was a colony that had finally become free and independent and thus had no dependency syndrome on Ethiopia, its former colonial ruler. Eritrea, on the other hand, argued that Eritrea and Ethiopia had complementary economies, and Eritrea had the advantage of once being a part of the Ethiopian system. Eritrea stressed that its problem is mainly and exclusively with the TPLF, a minority regime that exploits Ethiopia for the benefit of the Tigrayan ethnic regime and its supporters.
The elaborate structure that the TPLF itself created was based on the political logic that the Amhara and the Oromo would not make a common cause and challenge its hegemonic position in Ethiopian politics. While the Oromo and the Amhara constituted more than 60 percent of the population, in Tigray, the demographic base of the TPLF was only six percent of the population.
Given the structure of the Ethiopian constitution, it was a foregone conclusion that the TPLF would lose out when the other much larger ethnic groups became aware of their demographic and economic strength. There were several interconnected factors that hastened the downfall of the TPLF minority regime. First, the TPLF itself created the conditions for the ethnic regions to strive for self-determination. Moreover, the highly successful economic policies that the TPLF regime pursued benefitted, largely, the Oromo, as the locus of most of the economic activities in the country. Secondly, the federal structure that the TPLF implemented was highly skewed in favor of the TPLF, opening the door wide for accusations of nepotism and corruption.
Eritrea’s consistent portrayal of the TPLF minority regime as corrupt and anti-Ethiopian did also contribute to undermining the legitimacy of the TPLF as a ruling party. Throughout these years, 1998-2018, Eritrea portrayed itself as a nation ready and willing to pick up the ties and links that bound the two countries. The only obstacle, according to Eritrea, was the TPLF minority regime. Once the regime was defeated, the Eritreans argued that there would be nothing to hinder the development and implementation of good relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
In the early months of 2018, the Amhara and the Oromo jointly voted to oust the TPLF from power. The coming of the Oromo to power had started a couple of years ago. Their proximity to Addis Ababa and the demographic size had made the country ungovernable. By 2018, the Oromo political elite believed that they had the right to rule over Ethiopia as by far the largest ethnic group in the country. Moreover, they sat on most of the country’s resources as well.
Eritreans and Ethiopians are one people in two countries: the Abiy and Isaias short re-reading of history, June 2018 to November 2022.
Partly out of conviction and partly as a new political strategy, Abiy Ahmed, the newly appointed prime minister, apologized for Ethiopia’s reluctance to abide by the UN-brokered boundary treaty of 2002. He declared his acceptance of the verdict without any reservations.
The capture of state power by Abiy Ahmed in 2018 signified two things. First, it ushered in the definite and, one can say, permanent marginalization of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front. Riding on the huge support of the Oromo and Amhara (Abiy is half Oromo and half Amhara) as well as on the ethnic foundations of Ethiopian regions, Abiy signaled that henceforth power in Ethiopia would remain firmly in the hands of the Oromo-Amhara alliance.
The defeat of the TPLF by Abiy Ahmed and the latter’s readiness to sign peace with Eritrea were taken positively by the Eritrean regime. The sequence of events from April 2018 to December 2018 is important to describe.
Abiy Ahmed’s visit to Asmara, though well organized, did indeed demonstrate two things. First, the Isaias regime took the visit as proof of its consistent policy that it had no conflict with Ethiopia but only with the TPLF-dominated government—a government that was defeated by Abiy Ahmed. The second point was how the people of Asmara welcomed the arrival of Abiy Ahmed. Both Isaias and the people of Asmara witnessed the end of an era of war and the beginning of a new epoch of peaceful coexistence.
The long and protracted relations between the two countries came into the open with the visit of Isaias Afwerki to Ethiopia on July 14-16, 2018. In a speech that went viral, Isaias said loud and clear that “From now onwards, anyone who talks about the Eritrean and the Ethiopian people as two peoples is one who does not know the truth.” ህዝቢ አርትራን ህዝቢ ኢትዮጵያን ክልተ ህዝቢ ኢዩ ኢሉ ዝዛረበ ድሕሪ ሕጂ ነት ሓቂ ዘይፈልጥ ጥራሕ ኢዩ። The speech was an expression of two closely related manifestations—the first was the positive reaction of the Eritrean people to Abiy Ahmed’s visit to Asmara. The second manifestation was the overwhelming welcome that the Ethiopian people showered over Isaias’s visit to Ethiopia.
The speech by Isaias was not well received by many Eritreans in the diaspora, among whom the prolific writer Bereket Habte Selassie, in his Eritrea: Nationhood and Sovereignty (2022: 10), commented as follows:
“Isaias Afewerki told a cheering crowd that henceforth there would not be a separate Eritrea and Ethiopia. “We are one people,” he was telling them, and anyone who doubts this must have his head examined, he seemed to intimate. This was music to the crowd’s ears. Here is what they [Ethiopians] thought to be the archenemy of Ethiopia—the devil incarnate—proclaiming in no uncertain terms that he was one of them—a lost child come home from the cold. “According to Bereket Habte Selassie, the speech that Isaias gave in Addis Ababa “was an act of treason punishable with death” (2022:10).
The opening of the border in September 2018 was another milestone in the relations between the two countries. Thousands of Eritreans moved to Ethiopia, and an equal number of Ethiopians visited Eritrea. The opening of the border without any legal framework—a very strong manifestation of irredentism from both sides—soon led to the full exposure of the asymmetrical power relations between the two countries. Eritrea was inundated with Ethiopian products while the Eritrean youth migrated an masse to the central parts of Ethiopia, exacerbating the already tenuous labor market.
The border remained open only for six months, although flights between Addis Ababa and Asmara were not interrupted. The Eritrean government did not give reasons for the closure of the physical border; however, its critics argued that it closed the border to protect itself from any economic influence coming from the still TPLF-dominated Tigray. However, a far more important reason for the closure of the border was the outmigration of Eritreans to Ethiopia. Only in the first six months, up to 100,000 Eritreans left Eritrea for Ethiopia and from Ethiopia to other countries.
Ethiopia fully understood Eritrea’s demographic problem. In August 2019, Prime Minister Abiy gave two reasons for what he called the temporary closure of the border. He stated that Ethiopia and Eritrea must first work out mechanisms on two important issues. The first is to manage the pressure of Eritreans wanting to migrate to Ethiopia, and the second is to work out a trade harmonization policy to the satisfaction of both countries.
Relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia did not improve as expected. Eritrea persistently demanded that Ethiopia move away from an ethnic-based federal structure and that it take a hard stand on the TPLF as the main political force that created conflict between Eritrea and the rest of Ethiopia.
In the 2020-2022 war between Ethiopia and Tigray, Eritrea played a key role in the total defeat of the TPLF. Although the role that Eritrea played is fully acknowledged, the latter was not invited to be part of the ceasefire agreement signed in Pretoria in November 2022 (henceforth known as the Pretoria Agreement). Eritrea felt that it was sidelined. Since then, relations between the two countries have gone sour, epitomized by Eritrea’s decision to stop the Asmara-Addis Ababa flights carried out by the Ethiopian airlines in early September 2024.
Eritrea is neither important nor relevant in the emerging Oromo-dominated Ethiopian worldview.
Unwittingly, it was the Tigrayan regime when in power that created the conditions for the growth and consolidation of the Oromo, whose demography and geographical location were of crucial strategic advantage. Although the Oromo claim much larger areas both in the Amhara and in Tigray, their main base area is the vast region south, southwest, and southeast of Addis Ababa. The Oromo have a bustling demography to their favor as well as rich and diversified natural resources. Moreover, the Oromo have had, in comparison to other ethnic groups, more access to educational services.
So long as ethnicity remains an organizing factor in Ethiopian politics, then the Oromo, either on their own or with some minority allies, would remain in power and continue to define the future trajectories of the country. The Oromo-dominated Ethiopia would be pulled more and more to the challenges of the southern parts of the country and would pay less and less importance to what happens in the areas north of Addis Ababa. The Amhara and the Tigrayan politicians would undoubtedly try to either defeat the Oromo and their allies in the polls—an unlikely scenario—or play their cards the best they could and draw the attention of Addis Ababa towards the north. The continued political rhetoric of access to a Red Sea port would continue to be made if the Amhara and the Tigrayans stand with and behind the Oromo-dominated government.
The southward movement of the Oromo-dominated Ethiopian government would, I believe, gain momentum, and it is highly plausible that large urban centers would emerge in the southern parts of the region, far away from Addis Ababa but even farther away from Gondar and Mekelle.
The more Ethiopia concentrates its efforts on the south, the more it would lose interest in Eritrea. It would only be some parts of the Amhara (northern region such as Gondar) and Tigray that would be engaged with Eritrea.
The political implications on the future relations between Ethiopia, which looks southwards, and Eritrea, which needs Ethiopia as a hinterland, are of great consequence. However, leaving aside the empty rhetoric of access to the Red Sea, we notice less and less Ethiopian interference in Eritrean affairs since the coming of Abiy Ahmed to power.
Eritrea has greater scope of maneuver to chart its own future, but the question is what kind of future does the Eritrean state wish to have with its neighbors? It can be tentatively argued that the burden of developing sustainable relations between the two countries rests more on Eritrea.
Appendix
A letter from King John of Abyssinia to Her Majesty the Queen, Brought by Mr. Portal
No. 1.
(Translation)
In the name of God and Jesus Christ, whose mercy is great.
From him whom God has exalted, John, King of Sion, King of Kings of Ethiopia, to our friend, great and merciful Queen Victoria, by the grace of God, Queen of Ireland [sic] and Empress of India and defender of the Christian faith.
Since I wrote to you, how are you? For me, I and all my kingdom are well by the grace of God and by the intercession of our Mother of Sion. May God exalt all the saints; I am well. May the mercy of God endure forever.
I have received your letters of the 12th Tikemt [Tikimt—corresponding to the month of October] and the 16th Hedar [November], with reference to making peace with the Italians. To tell the truth, I have never done anything, and I have never committed any offense against you or against the Turks (i.e., Egyptians). When the treaty was signed between me and England and Egypt, it was laid down that no arms were to pass Massowah except by my permission, but they have not complied with the treaty but have passed weapons and sold them to the Shohos, and these have made great disturbances in my country. As for the complaints they (i.e., the Italians) made that they had been badly treated, the fault was on their side, and they began the quarrel by stopping the Abyssinian merchants and occupying Sahati and Wia and taking possession of them. Why did they stop the trade and come into my country? I wrote to them: “If you have come with authority from the queen, show me her signature, or if not, leave the country.” And they answered me, “No, we will not.”
On account of that they fought with Ras Alula, and many were killed on both sides, though we had in no way injured them. How can you say that I shall hand over to them the country that Jesus Christ gave me? That would be, as a command to me, unjust on your part. If your wish were to make peace between us, it should be when they are in their country, and I am in mine. But now on both sides the horses are bridled and the swords are drawn; my soldiers, in numbers like the sand, are ready with their spears. The Italians desire war, but the strength is in Jesus Christ. Let them do as they will; so long as I live, I will not hide myself from them in a hole.
The town of Ashangi, 24 Hedar, 1880, corresponds to December 12, 1887.
Source: Gerald Portal, An Account of My Mission to King Johannis of Abyssinia in 1887, [republished 2020].
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