The Cost of Not Learning: Eritrea, Ethiopia, and the Burden of History
Saleh G. Johar14 min read
When leaders repeat the mistakes of their predecessors, nations pay the price, and the Horn of Africa bears the burden.
For the umpteenth time, the shadow of death and destruction is hovering over the Horn of Africa. Once again, authoritarian leaders who have repeatedly demonstrated their indifference to the suffering of their own people are deciding the fate of millions. The youth, the region’s most precious resource, stand on the brink of yet another cycle of premature death, displacement, and despair. Meanwhile, the wiser and more principled elites, those who might have offered a different path, remain outside the fold of influence and powerless to avert the looming disaster.
This is the tragedy of the Horn. Power is concentrated in the hands of men who are ill equipped to steward national responsibility, and in the absence of institutional checks and balances, they become even worse than they already are. Those who should be leading, the competent, the ethical, the visionary, are systematically excluded. Many live in exile, where their voices echo but never penetrate the hardened walls of the regimes they critique. Others shrink into silence at home, forced to diminish themselves so as not to attract the watchful eyes of the security apparatus. The political imagination of the region has been suffocated by rulers who fear ideas, distrust dialogue, and treat dissent as treason. As a result, the Horn continues to bleed, not because it is destined to, but because its leaders refuse to learn from the past.
Why I Hesitated to Write, and Why I Must
I hesitated to write this column. True to the adage that in war truth is the first casualty, this war is even more so. The falsehoods, misinformation, and disinformation circulating today, amplified by social media, have pushed even the wisest among us into silence. I tried to do the same. But I also know that I cannot be indifferent to what makes a difference in the Horn of Africa. Fully aware that what I know is infinitely smaller than what I do not know, I compelled myself to write, if for nothing else, to highlight the obvious, because it is precisely the obvious that successive regimes in the region have consistently failed to grasp.
There is a reason why the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, and every other major international actor have called for respect for territorial integrity and the avoidance of war. In the final analysis, only dialogue, diplomacy, and adherence to the rule of law can resolve this conflict and ensure outcomes that benefit all parties. These same calls were made during the 1998 to 2000 war and again throughout the long and painful period between 2000 and 2022. If history is any indication, these appeals will most likely fall on deaf ears. So why bother? Because we must. Because we owe it to ourselves. Because war is a choice, and so is peace.
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My Position on Eritrea and the Regime
For more than two decades, I have written countless articles advocating change for Eritrea. I am not someone who will shed a single tear if the ruling regime collapses tomorrow. In fact, it is a day I await. I happen to believe that both the EPLF/PFDJ and TPLF have outrun their usefulness and deserve to be retired to the dustbins of history.
But I am not apocalyptic. I want responsible change, a transition from the status quo to something better, something worthy of the sacrifices Eritreans and Tigrayans have made. Eritrea does not need to become a failed state to be reborn. Everything I say in this column is about Eritrea, not about defending the regime. The regime has proven beyond any doubt that it does not have the best interests of the Eritrean people. Many Eritreans were stunned to witness the dictator’s unprecedented display of affection toward the Ethiopian people during the height of his bromance with Abiy Ahmed, a spectacle that revealed he could love people. Smitten as he was with Abiy Ahmed, he sacrificed what is widely believed to be an estimated forty thousand Eritreans to rescue him against the TPLF. Six years later, Eritrean families have not received even the basic decency of being informed that their loved ones perished in a war that had nothing to do with Eritrea. The TPLF had accused Isaias and Abiy of committing genocide, and in a shameless twist of irony, Getachew Reda is now aligned with Abiy while Debretsion is aligned with Isaias.
The regime of Isaias Afwerki has been the number one enemy of the Eritrean people. I would not encourage any Eritrean to die fighting for this regime. But for Eritrea itself, that is an entirely different matter. I want Eritreans to live for Eritrea, and I want Eritrea to live for them. War should only be a last resort and only in the defense of the country. The military adventures of a trigger‑happy dictator and megalomaniac should not be tolerated.
My clarity about the regime does not blind me to another truth. Since the inception of Eritrea, the Ethiopian state has repeatedly proven itself an unreliable partner for wisdom, enlightenment, and peaceful coexistence. Imagine where both countries would be today, development wise, socially, and politically, had Haile-Selassie honored the federation and respected the Eritrean people’s right to teach in their own languages and manage their own affairs. Instead, he planted the original sin of shortsightedness, political arrogance and domination of one group over the rest. Every successive Ethiopian regime inherited that sin and amplified it.
The Mengistu government, intoxicated by the support of foreign powers and armed with weaponry purchased with money he did not have while his people suffered abject poverty, marched to retake the liberated areas of Eritrea in 1977 and 1978. In the short term, he succeeded. But we know how that ended. Eritrea’s position has always been clear. We do not bet on the horse; we bet on the jockey. And today, I say, “Ethiopia, do not mess with Eritrea.”
With his massive arsenal of drones and advanced weaponry, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is equally intoxicated, and based on the swift takeover of the cities of Tigray, he might imagine he could do the same if he decided to invade Eritrea. Yet such a move would mark only the beginning of the conflict, not its end. No one can predict which side would prevail, but it is certain that both countries would suffer. It would be a mutually assured destruction.
It is this certainty that compels me to write and urge both sides to embrace the principles of good neighborliness, respect for sovereignty, and cooperation rooted in mutual benefit.
Winston Churchill once remarked, “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma, but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.” The same can be said of Ethiopia today. Its actions are shaped not by wisdom or foresight, but by the shifting interests of a regime that has yet to learn from the failures of its predecessors.
It is also important to remember what the EPRDF, under TPLF domination, did to more than ninety thousand innocent Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin during the 1998 to 2000 war. Mass deportations, property confiscations, and the weaponization of identity left wounds that have not healed. And now we face yet another Ethiopian government that has refused to learn from its predecessors. Instead of limiting its hostility to the Eritrean regime, it is openly declaring intentions to take Eritrean territories. This is an assault on all Eritreans, regardless of political affiliation. No self-respecting Eritrean, whether in the opposition, aligned with the regime, or politically unaffiliated, would tolerate such a violation.
The truth is that reconciliation, like charity, begins at home. The Eritrean government cannot reconcile Ethiopians before reconciling with its own people, just as Ethiopia cannot reconcile with Eritrea before reconciling with itself. Both governments speak of peace abroad while refusing to practice it at home. Both insist on regional stability while undermining domestic stability. Both preach dialogue while silencing dissent. Unfortunately, we have rulers who have chosen to put the carriage before the horse, attempting to fix the neighborhood while their own houses are burning. Until they confront their internal contradictions, their external ambitions will only produce more conflict, more suffering, and more instability for the entire Horn of Africa
The Etiology of the Current Conflict
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact etiology of the current conflict, but one fact is clear. The recent war began with the actions of the TPLF, just like the Badme war was ignited by the regime of Isaias Afwerki. The Federal Government of Ethiopia has the responsibility to ensure that it alone holds the monopoly on the legitimate use of military force. No country can survive when armed groups operate as parallel states. Yet Ethiopia’s problem is deeper and older. For more than a century, Ethiopia has struggled to be at peace with itself. Every major ethnic group has, at one time or another, taken up arms against the government in Addis Ababa. Even now, the Amharas, who once conflated their identity with Ethiopian identity, have joined the growing list of ethnic groups in open revolt.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed inherited this problem, but he should have known that it could only be resolved through genuine dialogue and reconciliation. Force cannot resolve it. Exclusion cannot resolve it. The theatrical national dialogue held months ago certainly could not resolve it. Reconciliation, by definition, requires engagement with those who are not with you. The Prime Minister excluded the very groups who should have been his top priority, and the war we see today is the direct result of that failure.
The goal of the Pretoria Agreement was to usher in a future political dialogue that would cement the initial objectives of ceasefire, disarmament, and humanitarian access. I am not someone who makes the perfect the enemy of the good, and I will take a badly executed peace deal over the best executed war. The Pretoria Agreement was good; it achieved its first and primary objective, which was to stop the bloodshed. The problem was that the parties did not allow it to take its natural course.
Why Eritreans Won the Thirty-Year Liberation War
One of the main reasons Eritreans won the thirty-year liberation war was unity. Eritreans were united in their overarching goal of an independent and free country. Internal differences existed, and even civil wars occurred, but the fundamental objective of sovereignty was never in dispute. That unity was the shield that carried Eritrea through unimaginable hardship.
Today, Ethiopian authoritarianism threatens to recreate the very conditions that once united Eritreans. The familiar arrogance of Ethiopian rulers will only delay the democratic change Eritreans have been advocating by forcing them to rally around national defense. When external threats rise, internal reform is postponed. Eritreans know this pattern well.
On Historical Claims and Expansionist Fantasies
I am not going to dignify the claims that many Ethiopians have been circulating to rationalize imperial and expansionist dreams based on selective history. The historical record is clear, and no amount of revisionism will change it. Prior to the advent of Italian colonialism, the Red Sea coastline was politically and legally under the control of the Ottomans and Egyptians, not Abyssinia or Ethiopia.
Legally and historically, Egypt would have a stronger basis for a hypothetical claim than Ethiopia. Egypt modernized the port of Massawa and administered the coastal areas until it lost them to Italy. Where was Mama Ethiopia when the Italians, in November 1869, bought the Bay of Assab and the island of Darmakieh from local Afar‑Eritrean chieftains. Ethiopia gained access to and ownership of the coast only through the federal arrangement with Eritrea, and it lost that access when it unilaterally abrogated the federation. Eritreans rose in rebellion not to restore the federation but to achieve complete separation and independence. Ethiopia’s claim to the coast was therefore contingent, temporary, and legally extinguished by its own actions.
No one can claim ownership of the Eritrean coastline except Eritreans themselves. They are the only people who have been constant in a land that changed hands under successive foreign rulers. Ottoman, Egyptian, Italian, British, Ethiopian. Through all these transitions, the Eritrean people remained rooted, present, and sovereign in their identity. That continuity is the foundation of their legal, historical, and moral claim.
Eritrea’s Role and Ethiopia’s Responsibility
There is no question that Eritrea, like Ethiopia and Sudan, has been a destabilizing force in the Horn of Africa. The regime’s shifting alliances, from partnering with the Ethiopian federal government against the TPLF to later aligning with the TPLF and other Ethiopian opposition groups under the Alliance for Survival, reveal desperation rather than strategy. These oscillations are not guided by principle or national interest. They are the reflexes of a ruler who treats geopolitics as a personal chessboard, moving pieces not to advance regional stability but to preserve his own power and satisfy his appetite for grandiosity. The result is a pattern of behavior that mirrors the wider dysfunction of the region, where leaders cling to short term advantage at the expense of long-term peace and where alliances are formed not to solve problems but to survive them.
Before any meaningful reconciliation between Ethiopians and Eritreans, there must first be reconciliation among Eritreans themselves and among Ethiopians themselves. Reconciliation begins at home. A country that has not reconciled with its own people cannot credibly promote reconciliation across borders. Domestic fractures inevitably spill outward, and unresolved grievances at home become fuel for adventurism abroad. Genuine reconciliation would eliminate any need for a state to support or foment rebellions among disgruntled groups in neighboring countries.
Just as Eritrea cannot promote democracy or stability in Ethiopia through misguided intervention, Ethiopia must recognize the same truth. The path to a democratic Eritrea that can work constructively with its neighbors will not be forged through invasion or territorial claims. Such an approach strengthens the regime’s narrative, unites Eritreans against external aggression, and postpones the democratic transformation many have struggled to achieve.
Regional stability cannot be built on coercion, opportunistic alliances, or territorial fantasies. It can only emerge from internal reconciliation, respect for sovereignty, and cooperation grounded in mutual benefit. Until both countries confront their internal contradictions, any attempt at cross‑border reconciliation will remain an illusion that deepens instability rather than resolving it.
Reconciliation with one’s own people requires courage and wisdom. Choosing war with neighbors is a deflection from what truly matters, a political maneuver that distracts from domestic failures and shifts attention away from the urgent need for national renewal. It is, in essence, an attempt to wag the dog.
Ports, Economics, and Reality
Ethiopia needs and should use all the ports in the Horn of Africa to meet its economic needs. This is not controversial. It is common sense. But access must be grounded in economic logic, not in imperial nostalgia or expansionist fantasies. Geography itself dictates the obvious. The northern regions of Ethiopia are most efficiently served by Massawa, Port Sudan and Asab. The southern regions are naturally oriented toward Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, and Asab.
Rational states behave accordingly. They negotiate access, build infrastructure, respect sovereignty, and avoid reckless rhetoric that destabilizes the region. The Horn of Africa is too fragile, too interconnected, and too historically burdened for any country to indulge in territorial adventurism disguised as strategic necessity. Ethiopia’s prosperity will come not from claiming ports it does not own, but from forging cooperative, lawful, and mutually beneficial arrangements with its neighbors. That is how stable nations rise, and how fragile regions avoid yet another cycle of avoidable conflict.
The Crossroads
The Horn of Africa stands at a crossroads. Eritrea’s regime has exhausted its legitimacy. Ethiopia’s rulers are repeating the mistakes of their predecessors. The region’s youth are once again being positioned as cannon fodder. And the elites who could offer a different path remain marginalized.
But the people of the Horn, Eritreans, Ethiopians, Somalis, Sudanese, deserve better. They deserve peace, dignity, and governments that serve them rather than exploit them. They deserve leaders who understand that stability is built through reconciliation, not aggression; through institutions, not personality cults; through cooperation, not expansionism.
The region has suffered enough. The youth have died enough. The mothers have mourned enough. The nations have bled enough.
To contact the author: weriz@yahoo.com