I was compelled to write this piece after hearing from a friend about a recent interview allegedly given by Bereket Simon, Ethiopia’s former Minister of Communication, on an Amharic-language radio station. Relying on my friend’s translation, I found Bereket’s remarks deeply troubling. He suggested that Eritrea should preemptively surrender ownership of Assab to avoid an Ethiopian military offensive—implying that if Ethiopia were to act, it wouldn’t stop at Assab. His advice to Eritrea was to “do the smart thing” and cede the port to spare itself unnecessary damage.
Although Bereket Simon is of Eritrean ancestry, his comments betray a profound misunderstanding of Eritrean identity and history. Asking Eritreans to relinquish Assab is tantamount to telling them their thirty-year struggle for independence and sovereignty was misguided or meaningless. That’s not just offensive—it’s delusional. It’s not going to happen.
Assab is where Eritrea’s story began 134 years ago. It is Eritrea’s first-born province. There is no Eritrea without Assab, and no Assab without Eritrea.
Ethiopia’s request for port access and a corridor through Eritrea is as ironic as Egypt asking Ethiopia to dictate the use of Nile waters. Both involve sovereign resources. Both demand diplomacy grounded in mutual respect. Threats of force or violations of sovereignty are reckless and destabilizing. The only viable path forward is through negotiated, mutually beneficial arrangements.
In fact, it is in Eritrea’s strategic interest to allow Ethiopia access to its ports. Such cooperation could generate revenue, foster regional integration, and reduce tensions. Eritrea could even consider expanding its port infrastructure to meet future demand. But Ethiopia must avoid the trap of overreliance. Diversifying sea access through Djibouti, Somaliland, Sudan, and Kenya is not just wise—it’s essential. Political volatility, economic leverage, and strategic vulnerability all increase when a nation depends on a single corridor.
History makes this clear. Over the past 134 years, Ethiopia has had access to Eritrean ports for only 46 years—just 34% of the time. For the remaining 66%, it relied on alternatives. Moreover, large portions of Ethiopia are geographically better served by non-Eritrean ports, making the fixation on Assab not only impractical but illogical.
Ethiopia has earned international respect for its principled stance on the Nile. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) was built to generate electricity and drive development. Ethiopia has consistently rejected Egypt’s threats of military action, citing international law and the principle of equitable and reasonable use of shared watercourses. On the Nile, Ethiopia has taken the high road—championing negotiation, fairness, and peaceful resolution.
But when it comes to the Red Sea, the message has been far less consistent. In 2023, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed described Ethiopia’s lack of sea access as “existential,” and some of his remarks raised fears of a potential attempt to seize Assab. That’s a dangerous precedent. Unlike the Nile, which is a transboundary river governed by international frameworks, Assab is sovereign Eritrean territory. International law is unequivocal: land cannot be taken by force.
Ethiopia cannot credibly demand that Egypt refrain from threats while using similar rhetoric toward Eritrea. This inconsistency undermines Ethiopia’s moral authority and diplomatic credibility. If Ethiopia wants others to respect international norms, it must uphold them itself.
Context matters. Ethiopia was excluded from colonial-era Nile treaties, giving it legitimate grounds to challenge outdated agreements and pursue its own development. But the Red Sea issue is fundamentally different. Eritrea gained independence militarily in 1991 and legally through a UN-supervised referendum in 1993. Ethiopia lost access to Assab after a brutal war. Eritrea now controls its coastline, and Ethiopia has since adapted—using Djibouti and securing deals with Somaliland and Sudan. While sea access remains expensive, it is not existential. To reduce costs, Ethiopia simply needs to increase trade volume and renegotiate for better terms. Access to the sea is no different from any other commercial arrangement—scale drives efficiency.
In 2025, Prime Minister Abiy clarified that Ethiopia would not go to war over sea access. That was a welcome step back from inflammatory rhetoric. But the earlier comments left a lasting impression and reminded the region how dangerous words can be—especially in a post-conflict environment.
Ethiopia cannot demand peace on the Nile while hinting at force on the Red Sea. Real leadership requires consistency, even when it’s politically inconvenient. Existential language may stir national pride, but only diplomacy can deliver durable solutions.
Ethiopia has a unique opportunity to lead by example. It can show that prosperity and security come not from intimidation, but from collaboration. That is the path to regional peace—and the only way to transform survival into shared success.
Here is the link: To Hear What Bereket Simon has allegedly said.
N.B. I’ll be sharing my reflections every Sunday. If you share similar convictions, feel free to reach out via email: weriz@yahoo.com
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