Why Prosecuting the Conscience of Government Supporters Misses Eritrea’s Fundamental Political Question
Abstract
What if we could establish, beyond any doubt, that the Eritrean government’s supporters are morally bankrupt? Would that bring us any closer to political freedom? I argue that much of our opposition discourse mistakes the moral character of government supporters for the actual political problem: the monopoly of power. This monopoly does more than deny citizens political participation. It shapes the incentives behind political loyalty, obscures genuine political preferences, and turns political disagreements into moral confrontations. My argument is not that government supporters should escape criticism or accountability. It is that Eritrea’s political future does not require their moral rehabilitation. It requires institutions through which our competing convictions can have consequences.
1. When Political Disagreement Has Nowhere to Go
There is something about the Eritrean opposition’s political discourse that I have increasingly found troubling, and it has to do with what exactly we understand our political question to be. We oppose a government that has monopolized political power, denied citizens meaningful participation in the affairs of their country, and made it practically impossible for competing political convictions to have any consequence. If this is the problem, then surely our central demand must be to establish a political arrangement in which power can be contested, shared, and transferred through institutions that recognize the equal citizenship of Eritreans. This, as I understand it, is our political question. And it is precisely in light of this question that I find much of our opposition discourse rather confusing.
Let me begin with the government itself, because I think this is where our argument must begin and, ultimately, where it must return.
The Eritrean government has not merely denied its political opponents an opportunity to govern. It has effectively appropriated the entire political arena. There are no competing political parties, no national elections through which the public can replace its rulers, no independent media through which competing political ideas can be examined, and no functioning constitutional arrangement through which political authority can be meaningfully challenged.
But I want to draw attention to a consequence of this arrangement that I think we have not sufficiently examined. When a government monopolizes political power, it does not merely prevent alternative political opinions from influencing public decisions. It also distorts the conditions under which those opinions are expressed, interpreted, and confronted.
Consider what happens when political disagreement has no legitimate institutional destination. In a functioning political system, I can disagree with you, organize around my disagreement, persuade others, and attempt to translate my convictions into public policy. You can do the same. Our disagreement has a political destination because institutions exist through which it can acquire consequence. I do not need to prove that you are morally inferior before I can challenge your political program. Nor do you need to prove that I am a traitor before you can defend yours.
In Eritrea, that distinction has been systematically undermined. Political disagreement cannot be tested through ordinary political competition because the government has closed the institutions in which such competition would take place. Opposition politics, especially in the diaspora, is consequently pushed toward symbolic forms of confrontation: declarations of loyalty, denunciations of betrayal, arguments about patriotism, and judgments about the moral character of those occupying the other camp.
I am not suggesting that the government is responsible for every unfortunate choice made by the opposition. We remain responsible for how we conduct ourselves. But it would be a serious analytical mistake to examine this political culture without asking how the monopoly of power helps produce the conditions in which it flourishes.
2. The Moral Prosecution of Government Supporters
Consider how we ordinarily speak about supporters of the Eritrean government. We are often astonished that anyone could support a government with such an appalling record of repression. We question their consciences, accuse them of moral bankruptcy, and hold them partly responsible for the prolongation of our suffering. The underlying assumption seems to be that a person with sufficient moral awareness could not possibly support such a government.
Perhaps. But suppose we establish, beyond any reasonable doubt, that these people are morally deficient. What exactly have we accomplished politically? Have we addressed the monopoly of power? Have we established the conditions under which our competing views can influence public decisions? Or have we simply succeeded in condemning people who will continue to exist among us, whatever political future Eritrea may have?
I think we have confused two different questions. One concerns the moral character of individuals. The other concerns the organization of political power. And while the two may intersect, they are hardly interchangeable.
And yes, I am perfectly willing to concede the worst possible case. Let us suppose that some people support the government precisely because they enjoy the suffering of its opponents. Let us even assume that political sadism, rather than fear, interest, or conviction, explains their support. What then? Is the political future of Eritrea conditional on our ability to correct these people? Must we first make them morally admirable before we can establish a political order in which they and we have equal rights?
I do not think so. Eritrea is not going to become a monastery of politically enlightened saints. It will have decent people, selfish people, opportunists, zealots, and people whose political convictions we may find utterly repulsive. That is not a peculiar defect of Eritrea. It is a permanent feature of human societies, and political institutions must be designed with precisely that reality in mind.
This does not mean government supporters should escape criticism. If someone defends arbitrary imprisonment, celebrates repression, or participates directly in wrongdoing, there is every reason to challenge them and, where appropriate, hold them accountable. But there is a difference between criticizing someone’s conduct and making the moral rehabilitation of that person the purpose of our political project.
And before we presume to understand their moral character, perhaps we should also ask whether we have adequately understood the circumstances under which they behave as they do.
3. The Political Incentives Behind Loyalty
There are many reasons why people support the government, or at least publicly perform that support. Some may genuinely believe in its political project. Others may be motivated by economic interests, professional obligations, social attachments, family considerations, or the practical necessity of maintaining access to their country.
Consider an Eritrean living abroad who needs consular services, wishes to visit family, or has property interests back home. Consider an embassy employee whose livelihood is tied to the existing political arrangement. Consider also someone whose entire social life has been organized around government-affiliated communities, for whom changing political allegiance might mean losing friendships, recognition, and belonging. None of these possibilities requires us to assume that the person has lost all moral conscience. Nor should we assume that everyone who appears loyal is privately opposed. Human motivations are rather more complicated than the moral categories through which we have become accustomed to interpreting them.
Indeed, some of these incentives are connected to the very arrangement of power we are supposed to be challenging. The Eritrean government’s relationship with its diaspora offers an important illustration. Access to certain consular services and the ability to maintain practical connections with one’s country have been linked to the payment of the two percent diaspora tax and other administrative requirements.
A government that exercises extensive control over the practical conditions under which citizens can return home, obtain documents, or maintain certain relationships with their country can make political conformity materially advantageous and dissent personally costly. Under such circumstances, a public expression of loyalty cannot always be interpreted as a transparent declaration of political conviction. It may be conviction, calculation, fear, belonging, or some combination of these.
The government is not only monopolizing the political power that we seek to contest. It is also shaping the incentives through which people relate to that power. And we, rather astonishingly, may end up spending more energy condemning individuals responding to those incentives than examining the institutional arrangements that make those responses consequential.
The same problem is visible in the performative nature of much diaspora politics. Social media offers recognition, belonging, and public approval. A person who loudly defends the government may receive affirmation from a community with which they identify. Another who publicly denounces the government may receive similar affirmation from an opposition community. This does not make their political positions equivalent, but it should make us cautious about interpreting either performance as a complete expression of personal conviction.
And are we in the opposition entirely free of these tendencies ourselves? Have we never seen individuals treated as traitors merely because they questioned the prevailing assumptions of their own political camp? The social cost of disagreement is not peculiar to government supporters. It is a broader problem in political cultures where loyalty becomes a condition of belonging.
There is an even more consequential implication. The government’s monopoly creates an environment in which the actual political preferences of the public cannot be freely tested. We cannot determine what Eritreans would collectively choose through competitive elections because such elections are not permitted. Nor can we assume that public expressions of loyalty fully reflect private convictions when the costs of dissent and the rewards of conformity are distributed so unequally.
What, then, are we interpreting when we observe the political behavior of Eritreans under these circumstances? Are we observing convictions freely expressed, preferences adjusted to circumstances, or public performances intended to reduce personal risks? Very often, we simply do not know.
The monopoly of power does not only prevent us from acting on our political convictions. It also makes it more difficult to determine what those convictions are.
And yet we proceed as though the public behavior emerging from this environment were simply the expression of unconstrained moral choices. We are attempting to read individual consciences while neglecting the political circumstances under which those consciences are being expressed. Surely this reverses the order of analysis.
4. Who Actually Holds the Power?
Who actually possesses the authority to imprison dissenters? Who controls the security apparatus? Who prevents alternative political organizations from operating? Who determines whether the public can participate in the selection and removal of its rulers?
These are not powers exercised by an ordinary government supporter posting patriotic slogans on Facebook. They are powers exercised through the institutions and leadership of the Eritrean state.
A supporter may approve of the government’s conduct, defend it, rationalize it, or even materially contribute to its continuation. But approval of a monopoly and possession of the institutional power to maintain that monopoly are not the same thing. If we overlook this distinction, we risk obscuring the distribution of responsibility within the political system itself.
In a sense, the government has achieved something beyond the concentration of institutional power. It has helped create a political environment in which its opponents can become preoccupied with fighting one another over the meaning of loyalty while the underlying monopoly remains intact. We may spend years establishing who truly loves Eritrea, who has betrayed its martyrs, who has sacrificed enough, and who possesses a sufficiently upright conscience. Meanwhile, none of these judgments creates an institution through which citizens can exercise political power.
After all, suppose tomorrow that every Eritrean currently supporting the government experienced a sudden moral awakening. Suppose they recognized every injustice that we have described and privately agreed with every criticism we have made. Would that, by itself, establish constitutional government? Would it create independent institutions, permit competing parties, guarantee freedom of association, or transfer the authority to choose rulers to the public?
Not necessarily. Those are institutional changes requiring political action and a transformation in how power is exercised.
Now suppose the opposite. Suppose Eritrea established a constitutional political order while some citizens continued to admire the existing leadership, defend its historical record, and reject the political convictions of the opposition. Would the existence of these people make political freedom impossible?
Not if their convictions were subject to the same constitutional limitations as everyone else’s. They could organize, contest elections, win public support, or lose it. Their political preferences would no longer possess an exclusive claim to the state.
A change in the moral sentiments of government supporters is not equivalent to a change in the distribution of political authority. The former may happen without the latter, and the latter remains necessary even if the former never happens.
This is why the principal political challenge must be directed toward the monopoly itself. The government controls the institutions that prevent political competition, not the ordinary citizen whose loyalties we find objectionable. Individuals may deserve criticism or accountability, but those judgments cannot substitute for confronting the political power that makes repression possible and prevents citizens from contesting it.
5. Political Equality Does Not Require Moral Agreement
There is also a certain irony here. We complain, quite rightly, that the Eritrean government has made political participation conditional on loyalty to its own political project. Yet when we treat supporters of that government as morally disqualified from the political community, are we not flirting with a similar principle of exclusion?
I am not suggesting that harsh words spoken by the opposition are equivalent to the coercive power of the state. They are not. My concern is with the principle by which we imagine political legitimacy. If participation is a right of citizenship, then it cannot depend on whether someone has arrived at the political convictions that we consider respectable. Otherwise, what we seek is not a system in which different convictions can compete, but merely one in which our own convictions enjoy privileged standing.
Why, then, should I spend my political energy correcting the conscience of someone who supports Isaias Afwerki? Let him support Isaias. Let him admire the PFDJ. Let him believe, if he wishes, that the government has done everything right. My political disagreement with him does not require me to reform his character. It requires me to insist that neither his convictions nor mine should possess an exclusive claim to the institutions of the state.
I should be able to organize politically against him, advocate my alternative, and seek public support without fearing punishment. And he should retain the same rights. If he rejects this arrangement, then we have finally arrived at the actual political disagreement between us.
Notice how much clearer the question becomes when framed this way. I do not need to establish that I am more patriotic than a government supporter. Nor do I need to demand that he apologize for his convictions before we can discuss the future of our country. I need to ask whether he recognizes my right to participate on equal terms, and whether he accepts a political arrangement in which neither of us can permanently exclude the other from the contest for public authority.
And this question must be directed first and foremost toward the holders of political power. It is the government that currently prevents such an arrangement from existing. It is the government, therefore, that must answer for the absence of a fair political arena.
Of course, establishing such an arena would require more than a declaration of tolerance. It would require enforceable civil liberties, independent institutions, a functioning judiciary, political organization, public accountability, and credible mechanisms through which power can be transferred. The government’s monopoly is not overcome simply because it allows some criticism or invites its opponents to speak. A political platform is meaningful only when the public has the institutional capacity to make its political choices consequential.
There is, however, a test of our own political convictions that I think we should be willing to confront. Are we prepared to accept that people whose political ideas we find objectionable may legitimately win public support and exercise power under a fair constitutional arrangement? If our commitment to political equality disappears whenever the public disagrees with us, then we have not fully distinguished the principle of political participation from our desire to see our own convictions prevail.
And the same question must be put to supporters of the government. Are they willing to accept an institutional arrangement under which Isaias Afwerki or the PFDJ could lose political power through a legitimate public process? Can they recognize the rights of those who oppose them without requiring those opponents to demonstrate patriotic loyalty?
Our task is not to reconcile every Eritrean conscience. We may continue to disagree profoundly on history, leadership, national identity, and virtually every question of public importance. What we require is a political order in which these disagreements no longer determine who has the right to participate or who may exercise power without accountability.
The government’s monopoly has not simply taken away our ability to govern ourselves. It has helped deprive our political disagreements of a meaningful institutional destination. We are left arguing about whose moral standing entitles them to claim the country, while the actual power to determine its future remains concentrated beyond the reach of ordinary citizens.
The answer cannot be to establish another moral tribunal, this time presided over by the opposition. Nor is it to absolve anyone of responsibility for sustaining an unjust political arrangement. It is to restore the political question to its proper place.
We are not struggling to establish which Eritreans deserve political power by virtue of their moral convictions. We are struggling to establish a political order in which no Eritrean can monopolize power by virtue of those convictions.
Until that distinction becomes central to our political imagination, we may continue to win moral arguments while leaving the fundamental political question unanswered.
And the fundamental question has always been power: who possesses it, by what authority, under what limitations, and with what right to exclude the rest of us from its exercise.