Italian Colonialism (1887-1896): The rise and fall of Shoan and Tigrayan Politics

Italian strategies of colonialism in Ethiopia, 1887 to 1896: The rise and the fall of “la politica scioana” and “la politica tigrina.”

Background

Italy emerged as a colonial power in 1882 when it formally took over Assab from Rubbatino, a private shipping company, that owned the property since 1869. The scramble for Africa was about to start and Italy was invited and encouraged by Great Britain as a counterforce to the heavy French presence in Djibouti. The British were safely entrenched in the Gulf of Aden and had been for decades in control of Aden.

While the Italians were taking control of Assab, the British took over the port of Suez Canal due to Egypt´s failure to pay interest and loan to European banks. The White Nile (from its source until Khartoum was already under the control of the expansive and modernizing Egyptian dynast Khedive Ismail. The White Nile that provided only about 12 percent of the water reaching Egypt, however, was not as important as the muddy waters from the Blue Nile that Egyptians prayed for every year; Egyptian dependence on the latter goes back hundreds of years of recorded history. The Blue Nile provides up to 85 percent of all the water reaching Egypt. Hence, eager to control the sources of the Blue Nile, Egypt planned and carried out unprovoked wars of aggression against Ethiopia.

It is worthwhile to note that Egypt borrowed heavily to finance its wars of aggression against Ethiopia in 1875 and 1876. Egyptian wars of aggression were heavily financed and led by highly paid European and American mercenaries. The Egyptian forces were at both times (1875 and 1876) fought first at ጉንዳ ጉንዲ Gunda gundi (on the present Eritrean-Tigray border and the second one at ጉራዕ (Gura), about 40 kilometers southeast of Asmara. Egypt was defeated twice. The unsung heroes are emperor Yohannes and the population (present day Eritreans) on whose territory the wars were fought.

The war against Ethiopia financed by borrowed money soon led to bankruptcy forcing Egypt to relinquish its power over the Suez Canal to Great Britain as a partial payment of its debt. So, the British argued that the scramble for Africa started not by design but rather by default. Had the Egyptians were not so greedy and tried to swallow a chunk of land that did not belong to them, they might have saved their country and their independence. So had Rolland Robinson and John Gallagher (Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism, 1961) argued as a way of explaining the scramble for Africa.

Be that what it may, the Egyptians were defeated and consequently the British took over at first the administration of the Suez Canal and soon after the entire Egypt and its territories. These included all the area adjoining the White Nile and all the Red Sea possessions. The Red Sea coast stretching from Sudan to the Indian Ocean, which had been under the Ottoman empire (since the second half of the 16^th century) was leased to Egypt in 1865.

Entrenched in Egypt, the British then investigated their possessions and had a strategy to keep the French at bay. The French were already in Djibouti and to deter further French expansion on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the British invited Italy to occupy Massawa. The Italians obliged and in February of 1885, the Italian flag was raised in Massawa. The British knew what they were doing. Egypt had no need for Massawa, and the Ottoman Turks were not in the least interested. Nonetheless the British did not want to give it to emperor Yohannes, so they let the Italians step in and occupy it.

The Ethiopians (led by Yohannes, the emperor and by Ras Alula, the governor of the northern province, known as Mereb Mellash (መረብ መላሽ), felt betrayed by Great Britain, and were determined to prevent the new occupier any further land outside of the city of Massawa. Military confrontation was inevitable. Italy cannot stay in Massawa for long due to the hot climate. Short of abandoning Massawa altogether, Italy had no choice but to try to expand its possessions to the Ethiopian highlands. The Ethiopians maintained that Massawa belonged to them, and the Italians should go back to where they came. On January 27, 1887, a contingent army of five hundred Italians were ambushed at Dogoali (ተደዓሊ፤ ዶጎዓሊ) and all of them killed. Italy was defeated and it planned revenge. 

The rise of la politica scioana: Planning the war of revenge by undernimming the power base of emperor Yohannes

Italy implemented two principal strategies of revenge. The first was to seek the diplomatic intervention of Great Britain, the country that invited Italy to Massawa in the first place. The British who sympathized with Italy sent one of their best diplomats to put sense on the Ethiopians. Sir Gerald Portal arrived in Asmara and had a long list of demands that Ethiopia must fulfil to avoid war between the two countries. It is worthwhile to investigate in some detail that Italy as a victim demanded from Ethiopia.

Gerald Portal (1892:156-60) informed emperor Yohannes that the:

The King of Italy has replied that he is most willing and anxious to be at peace, and to have friendship and commerce with Abyssinia, and he has promised that all preparations for war will be at once stopped, and that no hostile action will be committed by Italy if His Majesty King John will agree to recognize Italian possessions of ሓባብ፤ ሰንሒት፤ሳሖ፤ (Habab, Saho, Senhit)  and that ጊንዳዕ (Ginda) would be the border between Italy and Ethiopia.

Emperor Yohannes replied that he would grant nothing entailing the cession of an inch of land, that Massowah itself was his by right, and that he had neither the intention nor even the power to alienate any territory which properly belonged to Abyssinia.

Ethiopia´s determination to keep the Italians either confined to Massawa or make them go back to where they came from was made in even stronger terms by Ras Alula, the arch enemy of the Italians. Here is how Ras Alula explained the issue of the matter to Gerald Portal, My Mission to Abyssinia, 1892:81-82.:

“The Ras [Alula] then said he knew why I had come because of the Italians, and proceeded to speak with great excitement about the whole situation, saying that the Italians should come to Sahati [ሰሓጢ] only if he could go as governor to Rome; that he had beaten them once, and if they advanced he would beat them again; that the sea was the natural frontier of Abyssinia, but England, who pretended to be the friend of the Negus, had given Massawa to the Italians”

Fully cognizant that Emperor Yohannes and Ras Alula would not accept the conditions for peace proposed by Portal, Italy continued its preparations for an eventual war of revenge.

To pursue the war of revenge Italy needed allies and found Menelik suitable for the purpose. Italy devised a strategy to create a wedge between emperor Yohannes and King Menelik of ሽዋ፥ Shoa. Italy offered Menelik firearms and diplomatic support in his bid for power as king of Kings of Ethiopia. Italy´s strategy of using Menelik to fight against Yohannes is what is called la politica Scioana. (ኣብ ሸዋ ዘተኮረ ፖለቲካ።) 

Italy approached Menelik in October 1887, nearly ten months after the Ethiopian victory at Dogali,( ተደዓሊ፤ ዶጎዓሊ) with a treaty of friendship, where it would support his ambitions to become emperor. Menelik was immensely satisfied with the Italian proposal; Not only would he remain neutral, but he promised that he would rather go to war against Yohannes than obey his order. In the treaty of October 27, 1887, Italy assured Menelik of military aid in return for a promise to aid the government of his majesty the king of Italy. Menelik was granted five thousand rifles, the first consignment. Italy pushed Menelik to declare war against Yohannes but was satisfied if he agreed to remain neutral.

In fact, By July 1888, Menelik announced that he was willing to aid the Italians in their war against Yohannes. [Richard Caulk, 1996:254]. For his services and political distance, Menelik asked for an advance loan to purchase 10, 000 Remington rifles and 400 000 cartridges – a request which was granted.

By the end of 1888, the Italians had succeeded to divide Ethiopia into two regions at war with each other.  A fundamental assumption prevalent in Italy of that period is that Ethiopia was not a unified empire but rather a geographical landscape with many rival kings who were in constant war with each other. Emperor Yohannes was encircled by the Italians in the north, by King Menelik in the south and by King Teklehaimanot in the southeast and by the Mahdists on the entire western frontier.

By December 1888, the Italians were ready to sign a treaty whereby they would recognize Menelik as the king of kings of Ethiopia, while emperor Yohannes was still alive. In this treaty Menelik was asked to accept the conditions of peace similar to that Gerald Portal had with him in October 1887. Menelik could not sign the treaty and Richard Caulk, 1996:284, explains his predicament:

“The proposal could not be accepted without risking the last hope of accommodation with Yohannes, whose rights it disregarded, and with the Tigrayans whose territory it ceded. Moreover, with their frontiers guaranteed, Menelik could not be certain that the Italians would be moved to take energetic measures before he had dealt with Yohannes”.

Menelik wanted Italy to deal with Yohannes. Italy on its part, pushed and shoved Menelik to wage war against Yohannes. The odds were in favor of Menelik who being far away from the army of Yohannes could afford to wait for better days, whereas the Italians were under great pressure to maintain a national prestige of race and power.

Italian forces in and around Massawa and the Ethiopian forces led by Ras Alula faced each other the most part of 1887.  In early March of 1888, Yohannes withdrew his major force (made up of up an army between to 50 000 and 80 000 soldiers most of whom were under king Michael of Wollo) to Gojam. The Italians had about 20 000 soldiers.

The northern border now left open; the Italians moved to Ginda (ጊንዳዕ)but not to the highlands. Why did Yohannes withdraw his forces from the highlands? There are three major reasons. The first reason is that Tigray has been a battle ground since 1875 and it had no more resources to feed an army of about 100 000 soldiers including supportive staff. The second reason is that the Italians refused to move out of their fortified military posts and Ras Alula realized that he had little chance of beating them. The third reason was the famine that had just started, and which was to last until 1892 and known as the Great Famine. This famine was caused by pest known as rinder pest that killed more than 90 per cent of livestock in Ethiopia. The pest was introduced by livestock that the Italians imported from India to Massawa soon after their occupation of the city in 1885.

From Gojam, Yohannes tried to conclude peace with the Mahdists, but the latter did not forget what Yohannes did to them on the bidding of Great Britain. According to Hewett treaty of 1884, Yohannes undertook to wage war against the Mahdists in return for Bogos and Senhit and the use of Massawa for free import of firearms. The Mahdists had encircled a contingent of Egyptian army (under the British since 1883) and Yohannes was entrusted to free them by defeating the Mahdists – a mission he successfully completed. This took place in the summer of 1884/5.

For obvious reasons the Mahdists retaliated, and looted Gondar in January 1888 and they threatened to do it again in March 1889. The Mahdists were supported by Ethiopian Moslems who fled out of Ethiopia to evade forced conversion to Christianity, a policy that was seriously and aggressively implemented by Yohannes. On March 9, 1889, the Ethiopians attacked the Mahdists and “were on the verge of triumph when victory was suddenly turned into defeat. King John was wounded amid the battle” (Holt, 1958:155). Yohannes, heavily wounded died on March 11, 1889. The Mahdist captured the dead body of Yohannes, cut its head, and sent it as a trophy to the Mahdi in Khartoum.

The treaty of Wichale (ውዕል ውጫሌ): the triumph of la politica scioana.

Neither Menelik nor Italy lost time to assert their positions. Fully convinced that his time has come, on April 25, 1889, Menelik asked Italy to support him by occupying Asmara and deny the Tigrayan leaders of any armed assistance. And in the famous treaty of Wichale signed by Menelik on May 2, 1889, Italy recognized Menelik as the king of Kings of Ethiopia and Menelik ceded territories that emperor Yohannes and Ras alula considered as integral parts of Ethiopia.

Here it is important to make a small digression and say few words on what and how much Italy gained from its la politica scioana. As spelled out in article three of the treaty of Wichale, Menelik ceded all the territory connecting Asmara, Segeneitti, Halay (ኣስመራ፣ሰገነይቲ፤ ሓላይ) to Italy.

In March 1888, Italy was still confined to Sahati(ሰሓጢ). In May 1889, Italy moved more than 100 kilometers inside the territory that Yohannes and Alula paid huge sacrifices to defend and preserve. The only exception to this vast concession of land, was the monastery of Debre Bizen. As specified in article four of the treaty of Wichale of May 1889, the Monastery of Debre Bizen with all its possessions shall remain under Ethiopian sovereignty.

Soon after his coronation in November 1889, (ሰሓጢ) emperor Menelik travelled to Tigray and reached Mekelle in February 1890.  Tigray was in great political crisis. Many chiefs were fighting against each other and those who were close to the deceased emperor Yohannes were far away from Mekelle. Menelik wrote to Ras Mengesha, the legal successor of emperor Yohannes, asking him to surrender but Mengesha refused. Menelik wanted to visit Aksum but since the route to Aksum via Temben was under the control of Ras Mengesha, Menelik considered the route dangerous and thus chose another route.

Yet when Menelik was on his way out of Tigray, Ras Menegsha surrendered and submitted to Menelik (Bairu Tafla, 1979:119) Before his departure, Menelik divided Tigray into two administrative areas: Seraye and Akeleguzay were given to Dejazmatch Meshesha Werkie and the rest to Ras Mengesha.

Menelik thought in full faith that the treaty that he signed at Wichale fulfilled equally the aspirations and expectations of both countries. Menelik supported by Italy became king of kings of Ethiopia and Italy supported by Ethiopia got access and possession of Ethiopian territories. However, Menelik did not realize that la politica scioana had much bigger and sinister plan the objective of which was to make Ethiopia an Italian protectorate.

The treaty of Wichale was written in Amharic and Italian – both official. In article 17 of the treaty, the Italian version stated that emperor Menelik shall carry out his relations with foreign powers through the good offices of the Italian government. The Amharic version did not in any way indicate that the emperor was obliged but that he may if he so wished use the good offices of Italy. The discrepancy between the two versions was very clear.

The Italians were fully aware that they were cheating but hoped for two things. First, once Italy has communicated its protectorate power over Ethiopia according to the treaty of Berlin of 1884/5, the Ethiopians would eventually accept it. The second eventuality was to go to war as conceding a diplomatic defeat in front of an African king was too much loss of racial prestige.

It was stipulated that the treaty of Wichale would be revised after five years except for article 3 (specifying the areas ceded to Italy).

From the signing of the treaty at Wichale on May, 2, 1889 until January 1, 1890, Italy did three things. First, it violated article 3 of the treaty of Wichale and expanded its possessions from Halay to the edge of the river Mereb, nearly 100 kilometers. Second, it informed European nations according to the treaty of Berlin that it had acquired a protectorate treaty over Ethiopia – which was immediately accepted by Great Britain. Third, it consolidated its disparate possessions (the western highlands inhabited by Habab, the southern Red Sea coast and the Abyssinian/Ethiopian highlands) into a single colony, named Eritrea.

La politica scioana: early troubles and the rise of la politica tigrina (ኣብ ትግራይ ዘተኮረ ፖለቲካ)

It was in October 1890, Menelik and Ethiopia realized the full meaning of Article 17 of the treaty of Wichale as it was written in the Italian language. Queen Victoria had written to Menelik reminding him that hence forth he could not write directly to Great Britain and if he wished to do so he had to use the good offices of the kingdom of Italy.

Menelik renounced Article 17 and informed all the leaders in Europe that he did not put his country under any authority.  Menelik´s refusal was interpreted in Italy in two ways. The official policy in Rome was that Menelik would be brought to his senses and that la politica scioana hasn´t failed. Negotiations between Italy and Ethiopia continued but by mid 1891, Italy realized that la politica scioana was in peril.

While Italy continued to work for the resurrection of the treaty of Wichale, the military command in Massawa took the matter into their hands and begun to mobilize forces within Tigray. Ras Mengesha, who had submitted to Menelik a year before, now decided to rebel and approached the Italians for support. On December 6, 1891, Ras Mengesha and general Antonio Gandolfi, the military commander at Massawa met at the banks of Mereb river and signed what came to be called the Mereb convention whereby Ras Mengesha Yohannes and general Antonio Gandolfi took oath of loyalty to each other: thy enemies shall be my enemies and thy friends shall be my friends. So started the short-lived la politica tigrina.

It is very difficult to fathom what Ras Mengesha and Ras Alula expected to gain from Italian policy of la politica tigrina. For the military command in Eritrea, it was just a ploy to send a message to Menelik that they could mobilize Ethiopians who would challenge him.  As la politica tigrina was not sanctioned from Rome, it withered away rather unnoticed. The Italian command in Massawa informed Ras Mengesha that the implementation of the Mereb convention was dependent on the King of Italy and emperor Menelik. Ras Mengesha came out as a fool from the Italian policy of la politica tigrina.

Menelik was fully informed of Ras Mengesha´s rebellion but was not in a hurry to act, partly because he knew that his rebellion was not supported by the king of Italy. In the beginning of 1893, that is four years after the signing of the treaty of Wichale, Menelik wrote to all European leaders that he would revoke article 17 of the treaty of Wichale. Menelik´s decision put Italy in a difficult position. To avoid the consequences of the loss of its prestige in Europe, Italy had to force Menelik to accept article 17 by force. The question was who would start the war and when.

Soon after his letter revoking the treaty of Wichale, Menelik found it appropriate to deal with the rebellion of Ras Menegesha and he did it in a very Ethiopian way. Menelik wrote a circular letter to all the important monasteries in Tigray where he denounced Ras Mengesha Yohannes for breaking his oath of loyalty and for conspiring with foreigners. He stated that he was determined to invade Tigray and absolved himself from responsibility for any resultant loss of lives and property. That Menelik´s punitive presence in Tigray would result in widescale destruction was not difficult to understand. The Tigrayans had witnessed Menelik´s destructive forces when he visited Tigray few years back in 1890. Thus, pressured by the heads of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the leaders of Tigray broke relations with Italy and informed Menelik of their decision to submit to his authority. In June 1894, Ras Mengesha Yohannes and Ras Alula arrived in Addis Ababa. La politica tigrina was buried for good.

In their discussions with Menelik, the Tigrayan leaders brought up the fate of Ethiopian territories occupied by Italy in violation of article 3 of the treaty of Wichale. It is important to recall that the Ethiopian territories ceded to Italy according to article 3 of the treaty were limited to the edges of the highlands. The area that Italy conquered in violation of article 3 was much bigger.

Ras Mengesha Yohannes, now fully reconciled with Menelik, left for Tigray with instructions not to start war with the Italians without express order from Menelik.

The collapse of la politica scioana

1894 was in many ways a good year. The Great famine that started in 1888 came to an end in1892 and farmers could harvest their crops. Leaders in Hamassien, Akele Guzay and Seraye begun to take stock of what the Italians intended to do in their territory. Farmers who were forced to migrate to far places due to the great famine (1888-92) came back and found that their land was confiscated by the new foreign rulers. Confiscation of land was a practice that was totally unknown in the annals of Abyssinian jurisprudence.

1894 was also the year when Menelik informed the world that he revoked the treaty of Wichale except for article 3 of the treaty. Italian diplomacy in general and la politica scioana failed to achieve their prime objective.

La politica scioana had two distinct dimensions which in turn affected the country in different ways. The first dimension of la politica scioana is article 17 which (according to the then prevailing International Law) put Ethiopia under Italian protection. The loss of sovereignty was of prime concern for Menelik. The second dimension is the occupation of almost all the districts of Hamassien, Akele Guzay and Seraye in violation of article 3 of the treaty of Wichale. This was of major concern for the leaders on both sides of the Mereb river.

The revocation of the treaty of Wichale in May 1894 signaled that both parties, the Tigrayans (to retake conquered territory) and Menelik to reassert his sovereignty could take measures that they deemed fit. But it was unlikely that Menelik would start the war because he already did what he could; he had rejected and revoked that article that bound him to Italy. The Italians, however, had to act one way or another. With la politica tigrina buried deeply, Italy had to resolve the issue militarily.

It was in this hiatus of stalemate the the people of Akele Guzay, Seraye and Hamassien in the newly formed colony of Eritrea initiated a war to drive out the Italians from their country. Led by Dejach Bahta Hagos, (ደጃች ባህታ ሓጎስ) a collaborator since 1888, the objective of the rebellion was very clear. Italians were confiscating their lands and taking their women. It was a rebellion that drew a clear distinction between different forms of governance. The slogan allegedly coined by Bahta Hagos: ሰንጋል ሓወይ ኣይትዓሹ ጻዕዳ ተመን አንተነኺሱ ደላሊኻ ነይርከብ ፈውሱ (Sengal my brother do not be a fool; remember that there is no medicine for the bite of a white snake sent a clear message that the opposite was not true, i.e., there is a medicine from the bite of a black snake. The rebellion of Bahta Hagos (between December 13 and 16 of 1894) was brief. Bahta Hagos was killed, and the Italian forces pursued those soldiers of Bahta Hagos that fled to Tigray. They were confronted by the forces of Ras Mengesha and Ras Alula both in Koatit (ኮዓቲት) and Senafe (ሰንዓፈ) in mid-January of 1895. Here it is important to note that Bahta Hagos wrote to Menelik some time In May/June 1894, but he was told by Menelik not to start war without his permission. The main source is Luigi Capucci, a highly placed spy whose informants had access to Menelik´s correspondence. Carlo Zaghi´s paper on Luigi Capucci provides detailed information on relations between Menelik and Mereb Melash.

The Italians acted. They pursued Ras Megesha and Ras Alula deep into Tigray and by mid 1895, they occupied all Tigray up to Amba Alage and were poised to extend their forces to Wollo. It was at this time, September 1895 that Menelik declared war.

It is interesting to speculate as to what might have happened if the Italians had restrained themselves and withdrew back to their territory after having defeated Ras Mengesha and Ras Alula in Senafe (ሰንዓፈ). This would almost certainly have created problems for Menelik because he would not have a prima facie case to start a war against Italy. He has done what he could. He revoked Article 17. It was up to Italy to react. The only way that Menelik could declare a war against Italy would have been to force the Italians to strictly adhere to article 3 of the treaty of Wichale.  It was, however, highly unlikely that Menelik would go that far because the violation of article 3 was not his prime concern. He did not mind at all that Italy had acquired a huge chunk of Ethiopian territory.

It is indeed correct to date the beginning of the Italian-Ethiopian war to December 1894 with the uprising of Bahta Hagos; a war that was concluded on March 1, 1896, with the resounding victory of Ethiopia. Italy lost 4 600 Italians and about 2000 Eritrean colonial soldiers. About 2000 Italians were taken to Ethiopia as prisoners of war. About 800 Eritreans were subjected to Ethiopian law applicable to traitors; amputation of left arm and right leg. About half of them died on their way home but those who survived were treated as demonstrative examples of Ethiopian barbarism and came to good use in the racist politics of the 1930s. A small digression here. The Italians killed about 800 Eritreans suspected of either sympathy or action against Italy during the reign of Ras Alula. The affair was known as the genocide in Massawa and took place in 1890. Michela Wrong (2005: 36-7) has reviewed the genocide at Massawa and added some more details and further strengthened the evidence. Are extra-judicial killings less barbarian than amputation of leg and limb?

[Here I wish to share Semere Habtemariam´s comment on the paragraph. “The insensitivity you show towards our grandparents who were victims of Menelik is mind-boggling. And to add insult to injury, you seem to defend it by saying that Italy did it too. Why can´t you be, at least, neutral and objective, if not a good grandson”. I plead guilty. I remain firm, however, to the belief that to live (with no limb and leg) is better than not to live at all].

The burial of la politica scioana

In the treaty of Addis Ababa signed on October 23, 1896, Italy recognized the full independence of Ethiopia. The treaty of Wichale was totally revoked and would remain revoked. It was also agreed that if Italy chose to leave its possessions it will return them back to the Ethiopian crown.

The Addis Ababa treaty was indeed a demonstration of power of Ethiopia. Menelik knew that the Italians were in no position to defend their possessions. Certainly, his French friends in Addis Ababa kept him informed of what was going on in Italy after Adwa. The anticolonialism movement was gaining momentum and the Italian state seriously considered of abandoning the colony altogether.

Yet to the great disappointment of Tigrayans/Tigrinya (including those in the new colony of Eritrea) Menelik allowed Italy to keep the territory, part of which was ceded by the defunct article 3 of the treaty of Wichale and part of it that Italy illegally occupied.

La politica scioana was buried but parts of Ethiopia remained under Italian colonial rule. For Tigrayans the victory at Adwa was a partial victory at best. On the aftermath of the treaty of Addis Ababa of October 1896, Blatta Gebre Egziabeher (Tekeste Negash, 1986:11) captured the mood of the elite in Eritrea thus:

“King Tewodros and King Yohannes, may the God of Ethiopia bless their souls, preserved their mother country with great veneration. But you your Majesty [Menelik] have severed its integral parts completely. …You are disposing of Ethiopia as someone disposes of his urine. This process is not of recent origin. It was you long before the death of emperor Yohannes who allowed them to enter and rule in our country”.

For those Eritreans/Tigrayans who felt betrayed by Menelik, the only option left for them was the path of irredentist politics – to struggle against Italian colonial presence and to re-unite with the rest of Ethiopia.

I have argued elsewhere that the great majority of the Tigrayans/Tigrinya ethnic groups in Eritrea kept the irredentist vision alive throughout the colonial period and eventually succeeded, but that is another story.

Acknowledgements

Tedros Anley (from the United States) and Chefena Hailemariam (from the United Kingdom) asked me if I could suggest easily accessible material on la politica Scioana (Shewa) and on la politica tigrina.

There is a huge amount of literature in Italian accessible to those who can read it. The few standard works on the political history of Ethiopia during the last two decades of the 19^th century do treat the issues but within a larger political framework. This paper is, therefore, an attempt to explain the issues for the benefit of those who either cannot access Italian or do not have the patience it requires to go through highly academic treaties. It has similarities with a term paper written on the bases of secondary sources.

Tesfatsion Medhanie has as usual been generous enough and read it and found nothing offensive. Semere Habtemariam has also read whose comments left me deeply unsettled and eager to pursue the metaphors of white and black snake, in our history.

I am immensely grateful to Saleh Johar Gadi for publishing it.

Additional reading
– Bairu, Tafla, 1979, “The Political Crisis in Tigray, 1889-1899”, Africa (Roma) 34:1 (105-128).
– Caulk, Richard, 1966, The Origins and Development of the foreign policy of Menelik II, 1865-1896, PhD thesis, SOAS.
– Conti Rossini, Carlo, 1935, Italia ed Etiopia dal Trattato D´Uccialli alla Battaglia di Adua, Roma.
– Del Boca, Angelo, Gli Italiani in Africa Orientale: Dall´Unita alla marcia su Roma, Laterza, Roma.
– Holt, P.M., 1958, The Mahdist state in the Sudan, 1881-1898, Oxford.
– Marcus, Harold, 1975, The Life and Times of Menelik II. Ethiopia, 1844-1913, Oxford.
– Wrong, Michela, 2005, I didn´t do it for you: How the world used and abused a small African nation, London.
– Portal, Gerald, 1892, My Mission to Abyssinia, London.
– Rubenson, Sven, 1976, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence, London, and Addis Ababa .
– Tekeste Negash, 1986, No medicine for the bite of a white snake: Notes on nationalism and resistance in Eritrea, 1890-1940, Uppsala, Sweden.
– Zaghi, Carlo, 1941, ”L´Italia e l´Etiopia alla viglia di Adua nei dispacci segreti di Luigi Capucci”, Gli Annali dell´Africa Orientale, volume 4 number 2, (518-557), Rome.
– ተከለ ጻድቅ መኩሪያ፣ ዐጼ ምኒልክ አና የኢትዮጵያ ኣንድነት፣ ፩፱፰፫።