Why U.S.–Eritrea Normalization Keeps Failing
A New Opening in a Dangerous Red Sea Moment
Washington is once again testing the possibility of normalizing relations with Eritrea. According to The Wall Street Journal and Semafor, President Isaias Afwerki has held quiet, Egypt‑brokered talks with Massad Boulos, the U.S. president’s senior Africa envoy. The discussions reportedly include easing sanctions and resetting diplomatic ties.
The timing reflects the dangerous moment in the Red Sea. Houthi attacks in the Bab al‑Mandeb, the war in Sudan, Saudi‑UAE competition, and Iran’s expanding influence have turned the region into one of the world’s most volatile corridors. With more than 700 miles of coastline—and nearly 1,400 miles including its islands—Eritrea is impossible for Washington to ignore.
But anyone familiar with the last 25 years of U.S.–Eritrea relations has seen this cycle before: early optimism, exploratory diplomacy, and eventual collapse.
A Structural Asymmetry
Every U.S. administration — Democratic and Republican — has attempted reengagement. Each time, the United States approached the relationship through institutions, laws, and strategic interests, while Eritrea approached it through the narrow lens of regime survival. That asymmetry has defined the relationship since the late 1990s.
In the early post‑independence years, relations were constructive. But the 1998–2000 border war with Ethiopia hardened Eritrea’s political system and reshaped its foreign policy posture. From that point on, external engagement was treated less as an opportunity than as a threat.
The Near-Deal That Collapsed
One of the most serious normalization efforts came in the early 2000s, when the Pentagon—under Secretary Donald Rumsfeld—pursued a security cooperation agreement with Eritrea. Negotiations advanced, but the State Department insisted on a basic condition: the release of two Eritrean employees of the U.S. Embassy detained without due process.
Eritrea refused. The initiative collapsed.
Ambassador Andebrhan Woldgiorgis later recounted President Isaias’s explanation: releasing the two would lead to pressure to release Petros Solomon. In that moment, the regime’s logic was clear—engagement risked unraveling the internal architecture of control.
Lobbying, Counterterrorism, and the Iraq War
Eritrea then attempted a different path. Under the late Ambassador Girma Asmerom, the Eritrean Embassy hired Greenberg Traurig—one of the largest lobbying firms in Washington—spending more than $1 million in an effort to rehabilitate its image. The campaign generated activity, but no structural progress.
At the same time, Eritrea positioned itself as an early partner in the U.S.‑led global war on terror. It joined the Coalition of the Willing that supported the 2003 invasion of Iraq — a war now widely acknowledged, including by many Americans, as a grave strategic mistake.
Between 2002 and 2005, roughly one hundred countries signed Article 98 agreements—bilateral immunity agreements intended to prevent the surrender of U.S. personnel to the International Criminal Court. While Washington viewed these agreements as necessary protections of sovereignty, many UN member states saw them as undermining the ICC’s legitimacy. Eritrea was among the earliest signatories.
Yet even this alignment—built on counterterrorism cooperation and strategic messaging—could not overcome the deeper structural problem: Asmera’s unwillingness to make even minimal political or diplomatic concessions. Its eagerness to cooperate with the United States in the fight against terrorism was driven less by principle or national strategy than by a calculated instinct for regime survival.
Just one week after 9/11, the government carried out a sweeping crackdown on the free press and dissenting political voices, imprisoning senior officials who had called for long‑delayed reforms and the implementation of the 1997 constitution. It used the global distraction of the moment — when the world’s attention was fixed elsewhere — to take draconian actions at home. And it used the war on terror to burnish its image abroad, hoping for favorable treatment from Washington.
There was no coherent national strategy at work. Only the cold logic of a regime determined to protect itself at any cost.
High‑Level Visits That Went Nowhere
Over the years, senior U.S. officials—from Assistant Secretaries to Special Envoys—traveled to Asmera in attempts to break the stalemate. Each visit generated cautious optimism. Each ended with no structural change.
Washington opened the door; Asmera refused to walk through it.
Sanctions and Their Limits
By the late 2000s, international patience had worn thin. The UN imposed sanctions in 2009 and 2011, citing Eritrea’s role in Somalia. The United States later imposed targeted measures in 2021 over Eritrea’s involvement in the Tigray conflict.
On paper, these were “smart sanctions.” In practice, they barely touched the regime. Eritrea’s political economy is insulated from many of the tools that make targeted sanctions effective elsewhere. The measures damaged Eritrea’s image more than they altered its behavior.
The Eritrean Embassy Responds
The Eritrean Embassy in Washington recently issued a statement criticizing what it called “selective narratives” and “alarmist interpretations” surrounding the possibility of rapprochement. It argued that decades of sanctions and isolation have failed and that a shift toward engagement is overdue.
The embassy reiterated Eritrea’s emphasis on sovereignty, non‑interference, and development models that avoid dependency. But this framing sits uneasily with the historical record. The UN sanctions of 2009 and 2011 were imposed specifically in response to Eritrea’s alleged involvement in Somalia, and the U.S. sanctions of 2021 were tied to Eritrea’s military role in Tigray. Whatever one thinks of the merits of those measures, they were not imposed in a vacuum. The embassy’s invocation of non‑interference omits the very actions that triggered the international response.
On sanctions, the Embassy was unequivocal: the measures were unwarranted, selectively applied, and counterproductive. Whether one agrees or not, the statement reflects a government aware of the shifting diplomatic landscape and eager to shape the narrative before substantive talks begin.
Why This Administration Thinks It Can Succeed
Some analysts argue that the current U.S. administration may have a better chance of moving normalization forward. This White House has shown less regard for traditional diplomatic norms, institutional constraints, and the promotion of American ideals. It has demonstrated a willingness to personalize diplomacy and engage authoritarian leaders in unconventional ways.
That combination creates an opening that did not exist in previous administrations.
Why It Probably Won’t
But history suggests the structural obstacles remain unchanged.
The United States can open the door. It cannot force Eritrea to walk through it. And as long as the Eritrean leadership views engagement as a threat to its survival — politically, institutionally, and personally — every initiative will eventually hit the same wall.
The regime is wary of Washington, but it is far more afraid of its own people, its own political prisoners, and the possibility that any opening could trigger demands for reform.
Engagement Is Still Better Than Isolation
Despite the long record of failure, normalization would benefit both countries.
Eritrean Americans could serve as bridges for investment, education, and cultural exchange. Eritrea could diversify its diplomatic relationships and attract foreign direct investment. The United States could gain a more stable partner in a volatile corridor.
Non‑engagement has delivered isolation without transformation. It is time to try something different.
The Real Test — and the One Rule Washington Must Not Break
The decisive variable has always been the Eritrean regime’s willingness to align its diplomatic posture with the country’s long‑term national interest. If this latest initiative can move the relationship even slightly away from sterile hostility and toward structured engagement, it will have achieved something sanctions and silence never could.
But if Washington is serious about engagement, then the early stages must be framed strictly as a U.S.–Eritrea track. Bringing Ethiopia into the mix—explicitly or implicitly—would only trigger the regime’s deepest suspicions and guarantee another collapse. The engagement has a better chance of success if it is perceived in Asmera as being about Eritrea itself. And if the process needs a nudge, framing it in a way that is not obviously advantageous to Ethiopia would likely produce a more enthusiastic partner in Eritrea. In a relationship defined by mistrust, perception is not cosmetic; it is the terrain on which diplomacy succeeds or fails.
The United States can extend its hand. Eritrea must decide whether it will take it.
To contact the author: weriz@yahoo.com
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