The Birth of the Mysterious Document
For a long time before Nehnan Elamanan was openly distributed, Isaias and his group were clandestinely circulating parts of it and messages with similar content. Apparently, the originals of these messages were kept in Kassala [Eastern Sudan], and many of those who were part of the planning, writing, or dissemination of the propaganda of Nehnan Elamanan have repeatedly—though vaguely—referred to them simply as “documents.” They all stated that Kidane and Welday were in possession of some “important documents” in Kassala, Sudan.
An interview conducted by Isaias Tesfamarian [an Eritrean librarian at Stanford University in California] with several EPLF (the precursor of the PFDJ) party officials is revealing. They state that, at one point after Kidane and Welday were killed, Ghirmay Mehari (now a Brigadier General in Eritrea) and Wolderufael Sebhatu (martyred in Nakfa) were sent to retrieve the documents from Kassala. [i]
Brig. General Ghirmay states, “They were very important documents…. Wolderufael knew the whereabouts and the importance of the documents because he used to work with them [Kidane and Welday]…. Once we got to Kassala, we got some of the documents but not all.” [ii]
Woldenkiel Gebremariam, a current minister of the PFDJ, says, “The documents were very important. Kidane Kiflu was in Kassala, and Kassala was the coordinating point with the field. He used to follow up on the situations in the field and record them. They were very important historical documents. Some of the documents (letters) were sent to the field. With the situation we went through in the field, it is hard to say where they are. Some documents were taken by Tekue Yhidego, etc., from Kassala to Aden. We used to have them with our Hafash Wudubat (Mass Organizations). After we went to the field, we did not know the situation of the documents.” [iii]
Naizghi Kiflu—an ex-minister of the PFDJ and its one-time security director, who had been critically ill for some years and died on February 6, 2012, in the UK—said, “The documents were very important. They used to describe the situations in the field. Who did what? Who got killed by whom, etc.—those are the sort of things that were in the documents. We left some of the documents with our Hafash Wudubat (Mass Organizations) in Aden, Yemen. Later, we heard that the documents were stolen.”
Mesfin Hagos, in a recent interview (the relevant part translated into English), also mentions documents: “…At the end of 1969… I was told that I was appointed to the engineering department, but shortly after… I went to Sudan. There were some books in Sudan that I brought along with me from China, and that would help us in my appointed position [military engineering]…” [iv]
In a testimonial booklet, Gebremedhin Zerezghi, a veteran combatant who lived through the events, writes, “Members of Srryet Addis [v] started to communicate and correspond through letters. When there was an attempt to read intercepted letters, it was impossible. Some were in secret codes, some were in numbers, and some were written in alphabets that seemed like Russian.” [vi]
We believe that those messages—and the repeatedly mentioned documents (referred to as “books from China” in Mesfin Hagos’ account), or some of them—are in the possession of the PFDJ. Once released, they would surely clarify much of the grey information surrounding this period. But until such a time, the available information is sufficient to deduce what the documents were about: perhaps the seeds of Nehnan Elamanan.
At a time of rampant political conflict within the Eritrean liberation forces, and when Isaias and his group were clearly weaving conspiracies, the ELF leadership was attempting to resolve internal problems. One side would naturally seek to defeat the other—at least in the propaganda war—and that partially explains the motive behind Nehnan Elamanan. At the same time, the ELF leadership proved seriously inept in resolving some issues and resorted to extreme solutions. Some of its actions are difficult to understand, let alone justify—for example, the decision to jail six members of the General Command, all from the Semhar region. This cannot be explained except in terms of regional bias, even if subversion was alleged, an explanation that was itself unconvincing.
It was amid this political turmoil—mass surrenders, espionage cases, and internal maladministration—that Kidane and Welday were killed. They may have been innocent, but even then, one does not expect revolutionaries of that era to establish courts and deliberate meticulously before passing sentences. Within the ELF, a serious attempt to establish a proper judicial system only began in 1975. And although Nehnan Elamanan alleges that hundreds of Christians were killed within the ELF, it names only two individuals: Welday Ghide and Kidane Kiflu.
In that environment of wild “revolutionary justice,” many innocent people—not only Christian highlanders—were killed, and many who fought against a more powerful entity were defeated. But defeat does not automatically confer innocence, nor does it mean the defeated should be treated solely as helpless victims. Had they prevailed in the power struggle, it is almost certain that the roles would have been reversed. Revolutions exact a high price; liberation struggles are neither peaceful nor gradual. Everywhere, revolutions are led by zealots and divide people sharply into enemies and allies, with little room in between.
Because of these complexities, it is important for Eritreans to know the nature and content of the documents kept in Kassala—and why they were so important that Isaias and his group were determined to retrieve them from Kidane and Welday’s house.
It is not far-fetched to consider that the “books from China” mentioned by Mesfin Hagos refer to the same documents Ghirmay Mehari and Wolderufael Sebhatu were sent to retrieve from Kassala. They may also be the same documents referenced by Naizghi Kiflu and Woldenkiel Gebremariam. Likewise, the clandestine letters described by Gebremedhin Zerezghi—circulating among combatants—may have been the catalyst for the killing of Kidane and Welday, whose names later appeared prominently in Nehnan Elamanan.
For decades, a serious question has persisted regarding Nehnan Elamanan: if the ELF was engaged in “slaughtering,” as alleged, why were Christian combatants such as Isaias and many others spared?
Theories: Why Kidane and Welday Were Killed
The ELF never formally denied or admitted to killing Welday and Kidane, though many who lived through the era privately confirm that it did. Explanations vary and are often general. According to Nehnan Elamanan and testimonies from senior EPLF figures, the period surrounding the killings was marked by mass surrenders of highland combatants to Ethiopian garrisons and the Ethiopian consulate in Sudan. In a politically polarized environment, these events cast suspicion on Christian combatants as a group.
Several factors intensified this polarization:
- A relentless Ethiopian propaganda campaign portraying the Eritrean revolution as a Muslim project and encouraging Christians to surrender under a blanket amnesty.
- The onslaught against Muslim populations—village destruction, mass arrests, and property confiscation—was carried out by Ethiopian forces, particularly commandos composed largely of Christian highlanders.
- The institutionalization of Orthodox Christianity as the state religion of Ethiopia, relegating Muslims to second-class citizenship.
- The military setback followed the Halhal debacle, which left the ELF weakened and seemingly unsalvageable.
- The Israel–Arab war, which disrupted Arab supply lines and further weakened the ELF.
- The rise of Marxist-influenced ideologies (from Yemen and Sudan) within the ELF, leading to friction between urban cadres and more conservative rural members.
These conditions likely explain why many doubtful combatants surrendered. But for patriotic Eritrean fighters who remained and opposed surrender, it was painful to be lumped together with those who defected. Such frustration could naturally give rise to a counter-narrative—either to vindicate themselves or to deflect suspicion.
For Isaias, this period offered an opportunity to exploit and revive long-held prejudices, as some of his schoolmates attest. The claims of “hundreds killed” and of Srryet Addis being wiped out can be seen as a defensive reaction by those stigmatized by surrender narratives. For Isaias, however, it became a strategic opening: a source of energy to propel a sectarian split and reverse the narrative against those he perceived as adversaries. He skillfully used these incidents to mobilize Christian highlanders, whom he regarded as his core constituency.
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