The Cycle of Blame: Why Tigray Can’t Learn from the War
Author’s Note
This essay examines a recurring pattern in Tigray’s post-war political culture: the public’s tendency to celebrate leaders during moments of triumph and condemn them during moments of failure, while rarely acknowledging its own role in shaping those outcomes. Using the popular Tigrinya-language sitcom Gere Emun (“Gere the Trustworthy”) as an entry point, it traces how media, public opinion, and leadership in Tigray have moved in lockstep, from wartime enthusiasm to post-war blame, without sustained self-examination. The central argument is that this cycle of uncritical support followed by reactive condemnation prevents collective learning. For Tigray to develop lasting accountability, it must replace the reflex of blame with a culture of introspection, one that recognizes public participation, not just leadership error, as part of the story of war and its aftermath.
The Pattern
The television series Gere Emun (“ገሬ እሙን,” translated as “Gere, the Trustworthy”) provides a useful record of post-war Tigray’s public mood. Gere Emun (a long-running Tigrinya-language sitcom currently with more than 250 episodes) is among the most widely watched television series in the region and enjoys strong viewership across Eritrea and the Tigray diaspora(1). Its blend of humor, social commentary, and everyday storytelling makes it a valuable window into popular sentiment. Early episodes supported the war effort and defended leadership decisions. Recent episodes criticize those same leaders and express regret about the war’s costs.
This shift represents a broader pattern in Tigray’s public discourse. During the war, media and public opinion supported government decisions(2). After the war, the same voices blame the government for failures. What remains constant is the assumption of public innocence: the people are always right, and leaders are always responsible for outcomes.
Consider the record. A major rally aired by Dimtsi Weyane in Mekelle featured thousands chanting “ትግራይ ትስዕር!” (“Tigray Triumphs!”) while presenters described the Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s military strategy as “unbreakable”(3,4). In subsequent years, the same channel aired investigative programs questioning the causes of Tigray’s military setbacks and assigning blame to TPLF commanders for “strategic miscalculation,” without revisiting its earlier broadcasts or acknowledging its role in amplifying wartime confidence(4). Similar reversals appear in the social-media timelines of prominent Tigrayan journalists; posts from 2021 celebrating battlefield gains give way to 2024 threads demanding accountability, with no acknowledgment of the earlier stance.
This creates a problem. If the public supported decisions that led to failure, but refuses to examine that support, the same pattern will repeat. Different leaders will make similar mistakes because the underlying dynamic (uncritical public support followed by blame) remains unchanged.
The War Years
When war began in November 2020, Tigray’s media uniformly supported the TPLF’s narrative. Journalists, artists, and public figures framed the conflict as existential defense. Questioning this framing was treated as disloyalty.
The slogan “Tigray Triumphs!” became ubiquitous. It appeared in media broadcasts, social media posts, artistic performances, and public gatherings. Tigrayans inside the region and their supporters outside, including Eritrean opposition factions, adopted it as a rallying cry. The slogan wasn’t merely optimistic, it functioned as a loyalty test. To express doubt about victory was to betray the cause.
This wasn’t unique to Tigray. It’s how most societies respond during wartime. The problem emerges afterward. When outcomes are negative, societies face a choice: examine how decisions were made or externalize blame.
Tigray has chosen externalization. Post-war discourse criticizes leaders extensively but doesn’t ask why the public supported those leaders or why dissenting voices were marginalized. Media figures who amplified government positions now criticize those same positions without acknowledging their earlier role. The same voices that proclaimed, “Tigray Triumphs!” now ask who is responsible for Tigray’s losses, but they don’t include themselves in that inquiry.
Dissent did exist, but it was systematically marginalized (5). Diaspora critics who questioned the feasibility of holding Mekelle indefinitely faced coordinated online harassment campaigns traced to TPLF-aligned accounts. These mechanisms (state/regional media, party youth leagues, and digital mobilization) were not passive reflections of public sentiment; they were deliberate instruments for manufacturing consent.
These matters because it prevents institutional learning. If failures are attributed solely to leaders, the conclusion is simply to replace leaders. But if failures stemmed partly from public pressure, media amplification, or cultural patterns that discouraged dissent (amplified by structural controls on information and speech) then replacing leaders accomplishes little.
Media’s Role
During the war, many Tigrayan journalists and media figures functioned as government advocates. They presented political decisions as moral imperatives and framed loyalty as patriotic duty. This was effective for wartime mobilization.
Post-war, many of these same figures now criticize government decisions, expose corruption, and voice public frustration. This criticism is often valid. The problem is the missing link: no acknowledgment of their earlier advocacy.
This creates a credibility problem and a structural one. The credibility problem is straightforward; audiences may question whether current criticism is more reliable than past advocacy. The structural problem is deeper: if media shifts from uncritical support to uncritical opposition based on outcomes rather than principles, it provides no stable framework for evaluating decisions in real time.
Functional media criticism requires continuity. Journalists should apply consistent standards before, during, and after events. When standards shift based on outcomes, media becomes a reactive amplifier of public mood rather than an independent analytical force.
The Innocence Problem
Post-war discourse in Tigray operates on an assumption: the public bears no responsibility for outcomes. When asked who is responsible for the war’s costs, the answer is always “the government” or “external forces,” never “we supported decisions that contributed to this.”
This assumption is politically useful, it maintains unity and avoids painful self-examination. But it prevents learning. Societies that cannot acknowledge their role in failures cannot develop mechanisms to prevent similar failures.
The public’s agency was constrained, not absent. Information was tightly controlled: satellite internet was cut in January 2021, leaving state media as the primary source (6). Federal blockades limited access to independent reporting. Yet within these constraints, choices were made. Crowds cheered the rejection of early cease-fires; diaspora fundraisers celebrated each battlefield claim. These were not coerced actions but voluntary expressions of hope under duress.
Consider the logic: If the public supported the war, mobilized for it, chanted “Tigrai Triumphs!” and condemned dissent, then the public participated in the decisions that led to current problems. This doesn’t make the public “guilty” in a moral sense; people operated with limited information under difficult circumstances, facing genuine existential threats and authoritarian controls on speech. But it does make them participants, not bystanders.
The distinction matters. Participants can learn from experience. Bystanders can only wait for better leaders. If Tigray’s public sees itself as having been passive victims of bad leadership, the only solution is leadership change. If the public sees itself as having been active participants in a complex situation (shaped by both structural constraints and voluntary choices) solutions can include changing public discourse, strengthening independent institutions, and developing norms that permit dissent.
The current approach (treating the public as innocent bystanders) forecloses these latter options.
The Cycle
This pattern isn’t new to Tigray, nor is it unique to Tigray. It appears throughout the region. During periods of strength, publics celebrate leaders and claim shared credit for success. During periods of failure, publics condemn leaders and deny shared responsibility for failure.
The pattern is self-reinforcing. Leaders learn that public support is conditional on success, so they avoid acknowledging problems until they become undeniable. Media learns that criticism attracts audiences during failures while support attracts audiences during successes, so it follows public mood rather than applying consistent standards. The public learns that it can avoid uncomfortable self-examination by focusing blame on leaders.
Each actor is responding rationally to incentives, but the aggregate result is dysfunctional. No one develops accountability because everyone can deflect responsibility. Leaders blame circumstances, media blames leaders, and the public blames both.
What Accountability Requires
Accountability means acknowledging one’s role in outcomes, both successes and failures. For Tigray’s public, this would mean recognizing that wartime support for the TPLF’s decisions contributed to wartime outcomes. This doesn’t require self-flagellation or apology. It requires accurate historical record.
Concrete steps can begin this process:
- Public archives: Establish an independent commission (possibly funded by diaspora remittances but insulated from party control) to collect and publish wartime media broadcasts, social-media timelines, and internal TPLF memos. The goal is not punishment but transparency: let citizens see the evolution of claims in real time.
- Media retrospectives: Require outlets that received state support during the war to air annual “accountability segments” revisiting their coverage, explaining what information was unavailable, and what analytical errors were made. Model: South Africa’s TRC media hearings.
- Protected dissent channels: Create pre-commitment mechanisms before the next crisis (e.g., a constitutional clause guaranteeing university autonomy during emergencies, or a diaspora-funded “rapid-response fact-checking unit” that operates outside regional jurisdiction.)
- Civic education modules: Integrate the war’s decision-making timeline into school curricula, not as propaganda but as a case study in how information constraints and group pressure shape choices.
For media, accountability means applying consistent analytical standards regardless of outcomes. Journalists who supported the war should explain their reasoning at the time, what information they lacked, and what they would do differently. This builds credibility and helps audiences distinguish principled analysis from mood-following.
For future decision-making, accountability means creating space for dissent during crises, not just after them. This requires cultural change, treating disagreement as potentially valuable input rather than as disloyalty. The mechanisms above are starting points; their success depends on actors willing to absorb short-term political costs for long-term resilience.
These changes are difficult. They require people to accept discomfort: leaders must accept criticism during crises, media must risk audience disapproval by going against popular sentiment, and publics must acknowledge their own complicity in failures.
The alternative is continuing the current cycle: decisions made with uncritical support, failures blamed on leaders, new leaders making similar mistakes. This pattern has already repeated multiple times in the region. It will continue until broken.
Conclusion
The war in Tigray ended, but the social patterns that shaped wartime decision-making remain intact. Media still follows public mood. The public still assumes its own innocence. Leaders still face incentives to avoid acknowledging problems until forced to do so.
Gere Emun reflects these patterns but doesn’t challenge them. Until the record is confronted (with evidence, nuance, and concrete mechanisms for change) the cycle will persist.
Consulted Sources
- GERE EMUN PART 255 | ገሬ እሙን ክፋል 255 ቕንዕና ክፋል 3 #eritreanmovie #eritreancomedy #tigrignamusic [Internet]. 2025 [cited 2025 Nov 11]. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nc8HbRIc-xA
- Ethiopia [Internet]. United States Department of State. [cited 2025 Nov 11]. Available from: https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ethiopia/
- The_Tigray_War_and_Regional_Implications-V2.
- Dimtsi Weyane – Tghat [Internet]. [cited 2025 Nov 11]. Available from: https://www.tghat.com/tag/dimtsi-weyane/
- Abera GH. For lasting peace, TPLF’s monopolization of power in Tigray must end [Internet]. Ethiopia Insight. 2022 [cited 2025 Nov 11]. Available from: https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2022/03/06/for-lasting-peace-tplfs-monopolization-of-power-in-tigray-must-end/
- Internet Society Pulse [Internet]. 2020 [cited 2025 Nov 11]. Shutdown – Ethiopia. Available from: https://pulse.internetsociety.org/en/shutdowns/ethiopia-2/
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